Violence, Territorialization, and Signification: The Political from Carl Schmitt and Gilles Deleuze

Abstract

While Carl Schmitt is one of the main proponents of the question of the political with the consequence that his thinking on the subject has garnered much attention, not only is the question of the political in Gilles Deleuze relatively underdeveloped, but there has been virtually no work done on the relationship between the two. The orientating contention of this paper is that thinking the question of the political from the works of these two, very different, thinkers will not only start to bring these two thinkers together but, in so doing, will allow us to better understand their individual thinking in a way that draws out conclusions regarding the nature of the political. While Schmitt’s friend-enemy division is the normal focus of analyses, I will focus on the role that violence and territory plays in fostering and sustaining this distinction to suggest that Schmitt’s famous distinction actually points towards the intimate relationship between the political, violence, and territory. Having made this connection, I then turn to the work of Gilles Deleuze who, I argue, maintains that the political is linked to pre-individual processes of territorialization and signification. The conclusion reached is that thinking the political from Schmitt and Deleuze reveals that it is intimately connected to violence, territory, and signification, which are primordially determined by ever-changing pre-individual, socio-linguistic relations specific to each society. It is to this pre-individual, socio-linguistic field that attempts to answer the question of the political should attend.

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Gavin Rae
Department of Philosophy
American University of Cairo

It has been noted that the striking, if not defining, feature of contemporary political philosophy is its concern with the question of the political (O’Sullivan: 1997, 739). Generally speaking, this is ‘the feature that allows us to call something ‘political’ (Van der Zweerde: 2007, 150) as opposed to economic, aesthetic, ethical, scientific, or philosophical, and so describes the transcendental condition(s) that demarcates politics from other disciplines. In other words, it seeks to answer the question: what makes something political as opposed to non-political? Symbiotically linked to this rise in interest in the question of the political has been an inexorable increase in interest in the work of the thinker most associated with this question: Carl Schmitt. While Schmitt’s notion of sovereignty is infamous (1985: 5), it is his friend-enemy distinction that has garnered most attention. Indeed, one commentator notes that this conceptualisation of the political has even transcended academic discussion to ‘become commonplace in general political discussion’ (Schlink: 1996, 432). Given this influence, one may, perhaps, wonder why another paper on this topic is required. In response, my contention is that it is exactly its dominance that makes another discussion necessary insofar as the danger of its dominance is that it has become passé, an empty cliché emanating from and covered over with hearsay and empty repetition. While this is sufficient to warrant an engagement with Schmitt’s notion, I also want to suggest that such is the dominance of the friend-enemy distinction in the secondary literature that other aspects of Schmitt’s analysis of the political are passed over. In particular, focusing on the friend-enemy distinction: 1) tends to offer a reductive account of Schmitt’s understanding that fails to
engage with other aspects of his thinking on the political; while 2) within discussions of the friend-enemy distinction, there is a tendency to highlight either the friend (Slomp: 2007, 201) or the enemy (Sartori: 1989, 64). My suggestion will be that, while these discussions highlight important aspects of Schmitt’s analysis, they do not get to the heart of the matter because they usually fail to ask the important question: what makes a friend a friend and an enemy an enemy? In other words, what is the criterion that distinguishes whether the social other is a friend or an enemy? In response, I will suggest that the existential threat the other poses to my own existence determines whether another state is a friend or an enemy. With this, my suggestion will be that Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction is actually based on a more primordial encounter of violence.

Furthermore, while the secondary literature tends to focus on The Concept of the Political, I will argue that this book must also be read in conjunction with the later Theory of the Partisan because, as Schmitt notes, ‘the theory of the partisan flows into the question of the concept of the political’ (2007: 95). In particular, I will focus on two strands of this book: 1) the notion of enmity developed therein, which will further delineate the notion of the political and its relationship to violence; and 2) the notion of the partisan, including its difference from regular soldiers, pirates, and thieves, which will show that, while the partisan is a political actor like the regular soldier, he is differentiated from pirates and thieves because of his concern for the social and, linked to this, a particular territory. My suggestion will be that the partisan’s intimate link to social territory reveals that the Schmittian political is intimately linked to territory, an insight that leads to the conclusion that politics in Schmitt relates to the relationship between violence and territory; or, put differently, the way a state uses violence to secure or expand its territory.

The linking of the political to territory brings us to the second thinker from whom this paper will approach the political: Gilles Deleuze. This is somewhat unusual. After all, Deleuze, to my knowledge, never discusses Schmitt and is more renowned as an ontologist than a political thinker. Interest in Deleuze’s relationship to the political has, however, grown recently and seems to be split between those, such as Paul Patton (2012: 9) and Ronald Bogue (2011: 90), who claim that, while Deleuze cannot be understood to be a political philosopher in the traditional sense, Deleuze’s concepts can be used to enrich political philosophy; and others, such as Simon Choat (2009: 18), who claim that Deleuze’s thinking, as far back as Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962), is intimately and constitutively connected to the political. It seems, however, that Choat vacillates somewhat in the development of his argument and ends with a position far closer to Patton’s. Nevertheless, we don’t need to turn to the secondary literature to determine the nature of the political in Deleuze’s thinking. Not only does Deleuze state that all philosophical creation is a political act calling ‘for a new earth and people that do not yet exist’ (1994a: 108), but, more explicitly, he states that his engagement with the political is most clearly found in Anti-Oedipus, a text that is ‘from beginning to end, a book of political philosophy’ (1995a: 170). While Deleuze’s thinking of the political emanates from his differential ontology, and, as befits a philosopher of difference, is differentiated, space constraints mean I won’t be able to engage with all aspects of his thinking. As such, I will focus on two aspects of his thinking: territorialization and signification.

Deleuze’s understanding of territory is, however, very different from Schmitt’s, insofar as Deleuze emphasises that the earth entails a continuous, open-ended process of alteration. From this ‘base’ of continuous alteration, he then claims the political aims to over-code this process of alteration with signification to give it meaning. In the two volume Capitalism and Schizophrenia project, Deleuze and Guattari explore this relationship further to show the ways different political regimes over-code the earth’s territory to provide meaning and ensure social order. Thus, while agreeing with Daniel W. Smith that Deleuze’s great contribution to political philosophy is to think of the socio-political body in terms of flows that become blocked into particular entities (2012: 160), I complement this by
highlighting that the Deleuzian political also describes the regimes of signification that block/code these flows with meaning. My suggestion will be that, while Deleuze agrees with Schmitt that this over-coding entails a form of violence, it differs from Schmitt because, whereas, for Schmitt, violence relates to an existential threat and is, therefore, by definition, exceptional, Deleuze maintains that the political is imbued with continuous battles to secure and define the meaning of events. As such, the violence of the political is not exceptional, but, for Deleuze, is implicit and ‘everyday.’ From this, the paper concludes by suggesting that considering the political from and through Schmitt’s and Deleuze’s thinking reveals that it: 1) relates to the use of violence to secure a social territory, 2) relates to the battle over the meaning of that social territory, and 3) reveals that analyses of the question must focus on the implicit, pre-individual, socio-linguistic relations from which overt individual political actions are but one affect. In other words, rather than being defined by security (Hobbes), justice (Rawls), consensus-seeking communication (Habermas), governmentality (Foucault), or democracy to come (Derrida), the notion of the political emanating from the Schmitt-Deleuze encounter reveals that it refers to a constantly changing pre-individual, socio-linguistic constellation that is intimately connected to continuously changing territorial boundaries which are determined and defended by violence and, increasingly, pre-individual regimes of signification that seek to give meaning to state violence and boundaries. In turn, ‘everyday’ politics refers to the various configurations of the pre-individual structures of signification that contest the meaning of state violence and boundaries. By undertaking this inquiry in this manner, we will clarify and explore the notion of the political in Schmitt’s and Deleuze’s thinking, start to place these two thinkers in relation to one another, and, by thinking the political from them, contribute to analyses of ‘the political’ by pointing to an understanding of the concept that revolves around pre-individual socio-linguistic relations which are politically manifested through the use of different forms of signification and violence to achieve a ‘vision’ (which is itself grounded in the pre-individual, socio-linguistic relations of each society) for a particular territory.

Violence, Territory, and the Friend-Enemy Distinction: Schmitt on the Political

Carl Schmitt’s project aims to delineate an autonomous, privileged place for the political amongst other discourses so as to combat, what he sees as, the de-politicisation process, a process whereby the political is reduced to law, economics, or morality. As such, along with sovereignty, the political is key to Schmitt’s thinking. Importantly, however, Schmitt explicitly claims he is not after a general definition, but merely ‘insights’ (1996: 22) into the nature of the political. This has to be remembered when discussing Schmitt’s conception of the political, but is too often over-looked as commentators focus on the friend-enemy division. While this division is, no doubt, important, I want to suggest that it is only one conclusion that can be gleaned from Schmitt’s understanding and, as we will see, is actually dependent on other factors, the most notable of which are violence and territory.

Schmitt famously starts his discussion of the political by noting that ‘the state presupposes the concept of the political’ (1996: 19). There are a number of implicit points to this statement. First, by placing the state ‘under’ the political, Schmitt is explicitly denying that the state is the apotheosis of the political. Secondly, any definition of the state depends upon a definition of the political. Thirdly, by distinguishing between the political and the state, Schmitt is intimating towards a division between the political, as that which determines the state, and politics, as that which relates to the technical organization and orientation of the state. In other words, while politics refers to the concrete tactics, divisions, arguments, laws, and actions that define the state, the political acts as the transcendental condition for the organizational structures of the state and, from this, the political actions that define the ‘life’ of the politics of each state. Given that politics is dependent on the political, Schmitt recognises the need to define the political as a precursor to defining politics. In other words, it is only once the political sphere is delineated that the daily tactics, laws, norms etc. of politics exist and can be understood. Seeking to bolster his claim that thinking is polemical (1996: 30), Schmitt utilises a logic of
binary oppositions to examine the logic underpinning economics (profitable and unprofitable), aesthetics (beautiful and ugly), and morality (good and bad), to argue that the political does not conform to any of these, but has its own characteristics which must be defined independently. As such, we find that ‘the specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy’ (1996: 26). Importantly, two further points need to be made about the friend-enemy division: first, Schmitt is clear that, because the friend-enemy distinction emanates from an existential threat, it is ‘the most intense and extreme antagonism’ (1996: 29). For this reason, it takes precedence over all other antagonisms. Secondly, ‘the friend and enemy concepts are to be understood in their concrete and existential sense, not as metaphors or symbols, not mixed and weakened by economic, moral, and other conceptions, least of all in a private-individualistic sense as a psychological expression of private emotions and tendencies’ (1996: 27-28). In other words, the friend-enemy distinction is not an abstraction, but relates to a concrete experience of an immediate other with the consequence that friends and enemies are subject to change depending on the concrete circumstances (1996: 34-35). Any alteration is not, however, based on psychological whim because the political a) is a social decision located in the state; and b) emanates from an existential threat to the state. Furthermore, Schmitt warns that the friend-enemy division entails a formal definition that distinguishes the political from other disciplines; it does not provide any material content that determines the specific norms of a friend/enemy relationship.

With this, Schmitt identifies an autonomous realm for the political, an autonomy that has, according to Thomas Moore, at least, three dimensions, insofar as it refers to the idea that the political: 1) occupies a unique and distinguished position vis-à-vis other discourses, 2) occupies an autonomous region whereby the political can be identified on its own terms distinct from morality, a distinction that will be important when Schmitt discusses the concept of the absolute enemy, and 3) is privileged over other discourses. In short, Schmitt is not simply delineating the political as different from, but equal to, other disciplines; he is distinguishing the political from other disciplines and safeguarding a privileged role for it in a world he sees as becoming increasingly depoliticised (Moore: 2010, 723). As such, we find that ‘the phenomenon of the political can be understood only in the context of the ever present possibility of the friend-and-enemy grouping, regardless of the aspects which this possibility implies for morality, aesthetics, and economics’ (Schmitt: 1996, 35).

However, while Schmitt notes that the political is distinguished from other disciplines and, indeed, is privileged over them (1996: 38), he maintains that the division is not absolute. While each non-political discipline is structured around a particular binary opposition, each ‘becomes that much more political the closer it approaches the most extreme point, that of the friend-enemy grouping’ (1996: 29). In other words, a non-political discourse can turn into a political discourse if ‘it is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively according to friend and enemy’ (1996: 37). With this, Schmitt turns what initially appears to be a difference in kind into a difference in degree whereby, for example, religion, while fundamentally distinct to the political, is not absolutely distinct because the antagonism it is structured around can intensify towards the political friend-enemy division. If it undergoes this intensification and does, in fact, manage to define its friend and enemy, it turns from a religious discipline to a political one.

While it may appear that Schmitt’s thinking is caught in a helpless logical inconsistency that confuses disciplines which are different in kind with disciplines differentiated by differences in degree, there is, I think, a way to explain and, hopefully, resolve this tension. While Schmitt doesn’t discuss it to any great length, he does approvingly point to Hegel’s recognition that quantity transforms itself into quality, thereby revealing that quality is the ‘truth’ of quantity (1996: 62). In other words, the quantity-quality dialectical movement reveals that quantitative differences in kind morph into and so are underpinned by qualitative differences in degree because each particular thing a) emanates from
qualitative movements of intensity that are differentiated into different quantitative particularities constituted by b) differing degrees of intensive movements (Hegel: 1969, 188). Interestingly, for our purposes, Deleuze also comes to a similar conclusion when he claims, in *Difference and Repetition*, that intensive difference founds extensive difference. The reasoning behind this privileging is somewhat convoluted, but can be boiled down to the following arguments: 1) Deleuze claims that extensive difference, which in its purest form is number, entails a singular unit which is self-referential or equal with itself (i.e. 2 = 2). Given that it is based on equality with itself, Deleuze claims, in a similar vein to Hegel, that number, and by extension extensive particularities are particular manifestations of a prior qualitative difference in degree; and 2) Deleuze maintains that differences in intensity are, by definition, differentiated meaning that intensity is differentiated into different particularities constituted by different degrees of intensity, a position that reveals that quality is itself quantitative (Deleuze: 1994, 233, 237-238). While there is far more to Hegel’s and Deleuze’s thinking on this relationship than I can hope to do justice to here, if we apply the general conclusions of their respective arguments to Schmitt’s position, we find that the apparent tension in his argument is explained. While the political is distinct from other disciplines, thereby securing its difference in kind, its (quantitative) difference in kind emanates from different (qualitative) degrees of antagonism, a continuum that a) secures the political’s difference in kind from the non-political; b) explains why the political is privileged over the non-political (greatest degree of intensive antagonism); and c) explains how the non-political can morph into the political (the intensity of the non-political’s antagonistic division intensifies to the point of the political’s ‘greatest’ degree of antagonism).

Having outlined Schmitt’s overall project and shown the political’s relationship to the non-political, it is now time to turn to the ‘contents’ of the political antagonism to look at what Schmitt says about how to delineate a friend from an enemy. The first thing to say is that Schmitt admits that it will be for each state to decide how to do this based on the specifics of each situation. But no sooner has he stated this than he goes on to discuss the friend-enemy distinction from the perspective of the enemy, a focus that will bring this distinction to life (Sartori: 1989, 64). In particular, Schmitt reminds us that the friend-enemy distinction is specific to the political because in economics there are competitors not enemies, while in morality there are only debating adversaries (1996: 28). Furthermore, Schmitt explicitly rejects the idea that the political enemy is akin to the individual who privately hates another (1996: 28). Enemy status is reserved for public enemies meaning it is related to social collectives as a whole. The creation of the enemy is politically important, both in the senses of the political and politics, because, as Torben Dyrberg explains, it ‘brings forth and ties together state and people: identification with community, people, nation, religion etc. and unconditional loyalty to the political leadership’ (Dyrberg: 2009, 656). While Dyrberg is clearly tying Schmitt’s political philosophy to his authoritarian political affiliation to dismiss both, Richard Bernstein raises a philosophical objection to Schmitt’s position because it is not clear how a social collective makes the decision to designate another social collective as a friend or enemy. This decision is an individual decision, which means it must be based on individual considerations. But this is exactly what Schmitt’s account rejects: the friend-enemy distinction must be based on public enmity not personal or individual enmity. As such, Bernstein concludes that ‘if public political enmity is not to be identified with private enmity and is not simply the sum or aggregate of the enmity of individuals, then Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction demands some account of how public enmity arises – and who or what determines this public enmity’ (Bernstein: 2011, 410). While Schmitt would possibly respond that it is the sovereign’s exceptionalism that determines who is a friend or enemy, Bernstein argues that this points to another lacunae in his thinking: the issue of political judgement and, more specifically, ‘how actors evaluate the concrete situation; how they assess whether their “way of life” is existentially threatened and whether this demands going to war?’ (Bernstein: 2011, 417).

This issue brings us to the crucial aspect of Schmitt’s suggestion that the political is defined by the friend-enemy division: what delineates a friend from an enemy? Schmitt maintains that the answer is
a simple one: violence. But not just any form of violence, the violence must entail a conflict based on a real existential threat, meaning the possibility of annihilation. In other words, a social body delineates another as a friend or an enemy based on the perception of a real threat to its existence. This must be a concrete experience however; a third party cannot determine the threat for another, only one party can perceive the threat of another (1996: 27). With this, Schmitt places the real possibility of death at the heart of the political. The perception of impending death, an exceptional situation, brings the social body to determine who is a friend and who is an enemy. This is not a possible threat, but a real, concrete threat. In other words, confronting its mortality, the social body recognises who its friends are and who its enemies are, a position that reveals that, for Schmitt, the political emanates from conflict. Indeed, Schmitt states that ‘the ever present possibility of conflict must always be kept in mind’ (1996: 32) and that ‘the friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing’ (1996: 33). It is for this reason that the political, based on the friend-enemy division, rooted in conflict, is so intense and trumps all other discourses. Only the political controls the physical existence of each individual; only the political can determine when physical sacrifice is needed to defend or expand the state’s territory (1996: 47, 71). As a consequence, the political not only decides who an enemy is based on the other’s perceived threat, but, from this, decides when and where to go to war. The political needs the threat of war because ‘a completely pacified globe, would be a world without the distinction of friend and enemy and hence a world without politics’ (1996: 35). Of course, it might be asked, what is wrong with this, why must the political be maintained, but, for Schmitt, this is a given that founds his position. The political must continue because it founds the state and state politics; without the political, the state may continue to exist, but it would do so as a sterile, meaningless entity. Only the white heat of battle can give the state meaning as an independent entity and ensure the vitality of its population. As such, we find that the political in Schmitt is intimately connected and, ultimately, defined by the state’s response to violent conflict. It is the existence of a conflictual threat that calls out for a political response, which leads to the friend-enemy distinction.

In the Theory of the Partisan, Schmitt returns to the notion of the enemy to expand on it, an expansion that reveals different forms of political conflict and, in so doing, not only bolsters my claim regarding the intimate relationship between the political and violence, but also points towards a second strand of the Schmittian political I would like to emphasise: territory. The partisan delineates a new type of soldier, one who ‘expects neither law nor mercy from the enemy’ (2007: 11). The partisan is unlike the regular soldier insofar as the latter maintains an explicit relationship to the enemy, wears clearly demarcated uniforms, and abides by, more or less, defined rules of war. The classical soldier is someone who wages war for a state against another state and ‘recognize[s] clear distinctions between war and peace, combatants and non-combatants, enemies and criminals’ (2007: 9). In contrast, the partisan operates covertly, does not wear a uniform, blurs distinctions, and operates against the enemy through non-conventional means. In short, he operates with a degree of intensity not seen in the soldier, an intensity which aims to overcome the enemy at all costs, including sacrificing his own life (2007: 14). Despite these characteristics, however, the partisan is still intimately connected to the political. He fights for a social cause based on a particular territory and, for this reason, is distinguished from a) the pirate who exists at sea and for his private gain and b) the thief who is focused solely on his private gain. Being linked to a particular soil means the partisan fights for that particular territory, a relationship that reveals the issue of territory lies at the heart of the Schmittian political. Indeed, it is the relationship between the political and territory that will bring Schmitt’s thinking into contact with Deleuze’s.

Schmitt’s discussion of the partisan also reveals distinct versions of enmity and, ultimately, will help to not only distinguish the partisan from the soldier, but also clarify the nature of the Schmittian political. Whereas Gabriella Slomp maintains that there are three different forms of enmity inherent to Schmitt’s analysis composed of conventional enmity between two states, real enmity, and absolute
enmity (2007: 203), I want to maintain that conventional enmity is an example of real enmity and not a distinct type of enmity. Real enmity, then, refers to enmity that is, in a sense, bracketed, meaning it is limited in terms of acceptable actions, spatial location, intensity, and is backed up with or conducted within clearly understood and accepted rules of war. What Slomp calls ‘conventional’ war, and Schmitt calls ‘classical’ war (Schmitt: 2007, 9), fits into this paradigm because it is conducted between two standing uniformed armies who target each other to attain specific, well-defined, territorially-orientated goals.

In contrast to real enmity, absolute enmity is more total insofar as it entails the intensification of the enemy to the point whereby the enemy must be annihilated. With this, all actions become justified as the war is conducted on subterranean, undefined levels and territories where the implicit maxim seems to be: the end (i.e. the annihilation of the enemy) justifies the means. While a political enemy is not thought about in moral terms and, due to his social status, does not result from personal hatred, the enemy becomes absolute when he is imbued with moral categories which degrade him and ‘make of him a monster that must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed’ (1996: 36). While there are limits to engaging with the real enemy, the ‘moral’ enemy of the absolute war is seen to be so reprehensible and so dangerous that nothing must be prevented from getting in the way of his annihilation. As such, it is no longer the case, as it is with the real enemy, that defeat entails pushing him back to within his own borders. Such is the threat posed by the absolute enemy that nothing other than his annihilation will safeguard the state (2007: 94). Importantly, Schmitt is highly critical of the move towards the moralization of the enemy, seeing it as an occurrence that can only lead ‘enmity [to become] so frightening that perhaps one no longer should speak of the enemy or enmity, and both should be outlawed and damned in all their forms before the work of destruction can begin’ (2007: 94). For Schmitt, the political enemy is always a real enemy, one who is fought against in relative terms, in accordance with a sense of soldierly respect which has the definite aim of defending defined territories. In other words, the real enemy of the political is an enemy fought for territory, a conclusion that again affirms my suggestion that the political in Schmitt is orientated around conflict and territory.

Giovanni Sartori has, however, questioned Schmitt’s insistence that the political is based on real not absolute enmity. Given that the political, based on the conflictually-orientated friend-enemy division, is privileged over other non-political spheres and that intensity is the criterion Schmitt identifies as the differentiator between the political and non-political, Sartori argues that Schmitt’s position can only conclude that a) the political friend-enemy antagonism takes precedence over the non-political, and b) ‘within’ the political antagonism there are degrees of intensity with absolute intensity being the ‘purest’ form of the political. As such, absolute enmity, as the most intense manifestation of the political, should be the form of the political Schmitt defends and recommends. Because he doesn’t follow this path, Sartori charges that Schmitt turns away from the logical conclusions his arguments entail with the consequence that his analysis is logically inconsistent. For Sartori, Schmitt’s conclusions can only lead to a politics of absolute destruction (1989: 71-72).

However, while Sartori’s argument may appear, on first glance, to reveal a logical inconsistency in Schmitt’s argument, insofar as he rejects the moralization of the enemy his theory seems to require, if we remember that Schmitt a) wants to maintain the political as an autonomous, privileged sphere; and b) claims that the political emanates from an existential conflict that results in the friend-enemy distinction to defend a particular territory, we see this is not necessarily the case. Given Schmitt wants to maintain the political, he must find a way to maintain conflict and, through this, the friend-enemy division. The problem with the moralization of the enemy and his transference from real to absolute status is that the latter entails a desire to annihilate the enemy, an action that would kill him and, in the process, lead to the annihilation of the political. As a consequence, Schmitt states that ‘for as long as a people exists in the political sphere, this people must [...] determine by itself the distinction of
friend and enemy […] When it no longer possesses the capacity or will to make this distinction, it ceases to exist politically’ (1996: 49). What would remain would not be ‘politics or state, but culture, civilization, economics, morality, law, art, entertainment etc.’ (1996: 53). While we may prize these activities, Schmitt reminds us that a world without the white heat of political conflict is a world of empty meaning. It is the political that gives existence ultimate meaning, ensuring that to abolish the conflict of the political in the name of peace would be to annihilate the fundamentally important aspect of our existence. For this reason, there is something in Matthias Lievens’ claim that Schmitt’s analysis does not simply entail a call for blood-letting in the name of the state, but entails ‘a metapolitical struggle against depoliticizing types of spirit or ways of thinking and for the particular spiritual form that makes conflicts political in the first place’ (2013: 121). Indeed, we will see that Deleuze will also conclude that it is the political that gives meaning to events, but, by maintaining that political signification is distorting and repressive, will depart from Schmitt’s valorization of the political. Nevertheless, because ‘the core of the political is not enmity per se, but the distinction of friend and enemy, and the presupposition of friend and enemy,’ (2007: 91), contra Sartori, Schmitt is justified and logically consistent in insisting that the political be based on real enmity not the absolute enmity of annihilation.

Schmitt’s analysis of the political is, therefore, defined through reactions to violent conflict, which aim at the actual annihilation of the state. For this reason, I have suggested that Schmitt’s definition of the political as being based in the friend-enemy distinction is, in actuality, far more complicated than this easily identifiable phrase indicates. In particular, it emanates from a real enemy who is aiming at the annihilation of the state, an entity defined by specific territorial borders. As such, the tentative conclusion gained from our encounter with Schmitt is that the political entails a unique sphere of social activity constituted by the exercise of violence aimed at an enemy’s attempts to undermine the territory of the state. Indeed, while Schmitt and Deleuze lie at different ends of the traditional political spectrum, it is my suggestion that Deleuze would, superficially at least, agree that the political is intimately connected to territory. The fundamental difference between them emanates from the way they conceptualize territory, with Schmitt appearing to view it as a relative stable, homogeneous unit, and Deleuze, in-line with his ontology of differential becoming, claiming each territory entails and exists through a process of de/re-territorialization, a process which the political over-codes with signification to ensure social order. To explicate this difference further, it is to Deleuze that we now turn.

The Political from Deleuze: Territorialization and Signification

Deleuze’s thinking is, however, significantly different, both in terms of content and language, from Schmitt’s. As such, it will be necessary, not to mention helpful, to first explain some of the terms Deleuze employs in his analysis of the political. Deleuze’s political philosophy emanates from his differential ontology, an ontology that affirms the notion that being entails an intensive differential becoming. In other words, being perpetuates itself immanently by undergoing a self-generating and self-perpetuating spatial, temporal, and intensive alteration whereby various flows congeal together to form entities, or as he calls them ‘multiplicities’, which are composed of a number of striations, segmentations, and intensities. When this is applied to society, we find that ‘the general theory of society is a generalized theory of flows’ (2004a: 284). From this, Deleuze will examine the ways through which different flows constitute different societies (Patton: 2000, 89), a methodology that will reveal the political entails a process whereby flows are expressed through particular territories which are given meaning by a regime of signification (or, as Deleuze and Guattari describe it, ‘coding’). As such, I will suggest that the conception of the political we get from Deleuze’s thinking is linked to territory or more precisely to the process of territorialization, and signification (2004a: 156).
Deleuze and Guattari start their analysis from the notion of the earth, which entails an alterable undifferentiated horizon (2004a: 154-155). Given that the earth entails an open-ended dynamism, it constantly alters. Territory emanates from a process whereby the smooth, undifferentiated earth is divided up through a process of territorialization (2004a: 155). Territorialization is, however, not a natural occurrence, but emanates from specific machines, the word Deleuze and Guattari use to describe flows that combine to produce social, linguistic, or productive entities. In other words, the state results from a particular social configuration that is revealed through and, in turn, reveals the earth in a particular territorialized manner (1995: 30). But once it comes into existence, the state, defined by particular territorial boundaries, does not simply exist unchanged; it is a continuous process of alteration. To explain this dynamism, Deleuze and Guattari introduce the de/territorialization-re-territorialization process. By de-territorialization, they mean the way territories alter and are altered through the movement of their different component parts. Through this process of de-territorialization, the territory of a society alters, changes, and becomes anew. For this reason, we must pay attention to the way territories de-territorialize; that is, alter, change, and break apart (1987a: 101). But this becoming does not entail an abstraction; it entails a flow to an alternative. No sooner has the territory de-territorialized than it re-territorializes in a different form. Each territory becomes through this de/re-territorialization process (1987: 54-55).

The deterриториational-re-territorialization process does not, however, simply happen, nor is it the case that it is a homogenous process. Deleuze and Guattari maintain that the form it takes emanates from a particular socius, by which they mean the pre-individual subterranean material flows through which each particular society becomes manifest. For Deleuze and Guattari, a society is never static, nor is the cohesiveness of each a result of explicit factors. Societies are shaped by pre-individual, non-human concrete factors such as the concrete earth upon which that society is orientated so that, for example, desert-based societies are structured differently to forest-based societies because of a) the material conditions underpinning the society, b) different linguistic structures, which, in turn, shape thinking, and c) different cultural norms which delineate the ethical relations that shape and determine human relations. The combination of these pre-individual cultural, linguistic, and territorial factors creates a matrix, which Deleuze and Guattari call a socius, that binds the various, mobile, component parts of a society together. Importantly, however, while each particular society entails a moving constellation of different components, the socius of each society is itself continuously altering. As a consequence, 'the consistency of any given assemblage is defined by its relations, and not any intrinsic characteristics; an assemblage exists as a singular, historically produced, intersection of relations' (Read: 2006, 221-222). As the socius changes, so too does the de-territorialization-re-territorialization matrix that not only defines each particular territory, but also defines its becoming; a process that, as we will see, has implications for the political (Patton: 2000, 89). Furthermore, while the socius shapes the de-territorialization-re-territorialization process, insofar as it shapes the way the component parts of the society interact, the socius also shapes the signification inherent to each particular de-territorialization-re-territorialization. The socius codes each particular de-territorialization-re-territorialization movement with particular signs to re-enforce the values, norms, and meaning of that particular socius. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari’s unfamiliar language regarding the way social assemblages code particular de-territorializations describes the way different social values and norms come to interact with, shape, and give meaning to different socio-geographic formations.

To describe the de-territorialization-re-territorialization matrix, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between relative de-territorializations and absolute de-territorializations with the latter being broken down into positive and negative forms. In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari explain that ‘de-territorialization is relative insofar as it concerns the historical relationship of the earth with the territories that take shape and pass away on it’ (1994a: 88). In other words, relative de-territorialization refers to the way actual ‘things’, whether these are social, geographic, linguistic, or
cultural, alter and change as a consequence of alterations in their actual existing component parts. In contrast, absolute de-territorialization entails a different form of alteration, which, far from entailing alterations in the constellation of component parts, entails an escape from these actual component parts to another realm. With this, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between negative and positive forms of absolute de-territorialization. The former entails a flight from the actual to a transcendent realm divorced from actuality, a flight that, in A Thousand Plateaus, is associated with subjectivity (2004: 149), but could also be God or some other transcendent first principle. This is an absolute de-territorialization because the transcendent is absolutely transcendent to the actual and is negative because a) it is viewed as an imposition on actuality; and b) is a flight to transcendence, a movement that, for Deleuze, violates the immanence of being. A positive absolute de-territorialization, however, entails a movement from the actual to the virtual, a movement Deleuze associates with the pure differential possibility of virtuality. This movement is absolute because it entails a movement away from the actual, but is positive because it accords with, affirms, and expresses the open-ended possibility inherent to being’s differential becoming. Because it is linked to pure virtual possibility, Deleuze and Guattari claim that positive forms of absolute de-territorialization are the source of revolutions, insofar as, by ‘returning’ to the virtual realm that ‘underpins’ actuality, they reveal and, ultimately, express an alternative to actuality. They are, in other words, linked to a call ‘for a new earth, a new people’ (1994a: 101). Importantly, however, the de-territorialization-re-territorialization process means that absolute de-territorializations ‘can only be thought according to certain still-to-be-determined relationships with relative de-territorializations’ (1994a: 88). Absolute de-territorializations depend on relative de-territorializations, insofar as it is from actual alterations that the possibility of positive forms of absolute de-territorialization emanate and are expressed. As Deleuze and Guattari explain, the movement to absolute de-territorialization, in either its positive or negative form, does not entail an absolute divorce from actuality to a pure, unencumbered realm, but is always brought back to concrete reality in the form of a re-territorialization (1994a: 101).

With this all too brief outline, we see that Deleuze’s understanding of territory is significantly different from Schmitt’s. Whereas Schmitt maintains a rather classic or static account of territory that sees any movement or alteration as a secondary phenomenon resulting from a state’s willed reaction to perceived existential threats, Deleuze recognises that territory entails microscopic, fluid alterations that are independent from willed decisions. Furthermore, while Schmitt seems to think the signification of the other as a friend or enemy is the result of a transcendent political subject, Deleuze not only rejects the notion that the political can be boiled down to a unitary division, but views signification as a primordial means through which the pre-individual socius of each territory is immanently determined, structured, and perpetuated. For this reason, Deleuze’s notion of the political is intimately connected to his notion of the socius and, in particular, the way this entails a particular de-territorialization-re-territorialization movement which is over-coded with significations. Suggesting that the political is dependent on pre-individual factors, such as the socius, not only differentiates Deleuze’s thinking from Schmitt’s, but, taking seriously Jeremy Valentine’s suggestion that the most important aspect of contemporary discussions of the political is their ‘displacement of the human monopoly of agency, not only with respect to technology, but also with respect to organic life at the sub-human or post-human level’ (2006: 511), reveals that Deleuze’s thinking on the political accords with the general orientation of contemporary thinking on the subject. The originality of Deleuze’s thinking lies in the degree to which he thinks the political from non-human/pre-individual factors. For example, according to Deleuze, it is not the case that human political action simply entails a human-centred decision which is either orientated towards or influenced by non-human events; the political, for Deleuze, refers to a pre-individual human socio-linguistic field that grounds individual decisions/action with the consequence that individual political action is an effect, rather than cause, of continuously changing pre-individual systems of signification. In other words, the great contribution Deleuze’s analysis of the political makes is to bring to the fore the pre-individual, non-human subterranean social and linguistic structures that
are often taken for granted in political analyses, such as Schmitt’s, that are grounded in an autonomous, individual, self-interested, rational, decision-maker. Deleuze’s point is that Schmitt’s autonomous decision-maker is not the cause, but an effect of pre-individual, socio-linguistic flows that shape his actions and thinking. By pointing in this direction, Deleuze not only radically challenges the notion of an individuated entity rationally choosing its actions upon which much classical and modern political theory rests, but shows that the political is intimately connected to, and ultimately defined by, each society’s pre-individual socius. To show this, I’ll now briefly outline Deleuze and Guattari’s analyses of the different ways in which primitive, despotic, and capitalist systems approach, structure, and are structured from and around different significatory regimes.

While Deleuze and Guattari’s three-stage description of social history mirrors Marx’s, the former continually reject the notion that they are describing a teleological version of universal history (2004a: 154). Rather than describe a teleological movement, they are describing three different regimes or ways of signifying the de-territorialization-re-territorization process. In short, I will read them to be using these examples to explore and make connections between the political, territory, and signification. The first regime to be examined, the primitive, territorial machine is a regime that territorializes the earth into specific, concrete territories. There is, in other words, a movement from the smooth spaces of the earth to the striated and differentiated spaces of territory (2004a: 160). Through this movement, the earth is transposed with territory and, as such, is ordered into specific spatial segments called states. As such, primitive societies are defined by a territorialization and, from this, the creation of division and order. While the primitive society divides its members into specific functions, orders, and hierarchies, these are defined by familial relations based on alliances or filiations. In other words, primitive societies are bound by personal connections and relations, usually familial, to other members of the group/tribe. Crucially, these relationships are tightly and hierarchically structured so each individual knows their place in the machine (2004a: 166). This particular social organization emanates from, links to, and re-enforces a particular system of signification.

In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari explain that primitive societies are defined by a pre-signifying semiotic because, while they are defined by signs, they have not developed a signifier as an additional moment to describe a sign. In other words, these systems of signification lack the sign-signifier distinction, but are, instead, structured from signs alone; that is, from natural objects which don’t represent something else, but are simply understood in and from their immediate form. As a consequence, the semiotics of primitive society emanates from a linear, ‘flat’, and immediate relationship to territory, wherein natural occurrences determine the meaning of events. But at the same time, signs are collective, diffuse, and, for this reason, multiple (2004: 149). Furthermore, while primitive coding entails a representation of nature, insofar as its codes come from nature, its coding is repressive because it not only sets and operates through fixed limits, structures, order, and hierarchies which define the roles of everyone involved, including the Chief, but does so in such a way that which is represented is distorted. As such, Deleuze and Guattari explain that primitive societies are coded in such a way that they are composed through ‘three instances: the repressed representative, the repressing representation, and the displaced represented’ (2004a: 181, italics in original). But there is a further aspect to primitive semiotic systems relating to the ways in which its signs are manifested. Deleuze and Guattari talk of a regime of cruelty whereby the significatory regime is literally marked, inscribed, and carved into physical bodies, whether these are objects or human bodies, to, for example, delineate positions of social hierarchy or family affiliation. From this, the primitive semiology refers to a literal, explicit coding whereby nothing remains hidden from view; all is explicit and visual (2004a: 207). Through this, the social order is manifested, made clear, and re-enforced.

While the primitive semiology is territorially-based, explicit, polyvocal, naturally-orientated, and based in and from a hierarchical system expressed by and re-enforced through physical markings and inscriptions aimed at delineating, repressing, and representing, the second semiotic discussed by
Deleuze and Guattari have a different relationship to territory and signification. The despotic regime arises because it challenges the old alliances and structures of the primitive, with this challenging entailing and establishing a different notion of territory, territorialization, and signification. Deleuze, with Guattari and Parnet, locate its historical moment in the desert, and more specifically the Pharaonic hierarchy (2004a: 210; 2002: 80). While the primitive system is based on defined, physical territories clearly marked by natural boundaries, the despotic regime is not based in or from nature, but is located from and in the notion of territorial expansion; that is, its relationship to territory is defined by the expansion of Empire (2004a: 210-211). To secure this extensive expansion, the despotic regime is intensively structured in a particular manner. While the primitive society entails clearly defined, immediate, inter-personal relationships based on alliance and filiation, the despotic regime moves from a regime based in natural territory to one based on a central figure: the despot. The despot becomes the Archimedean point through which all axes, vectors, plans, ideas, and actions emanate. In particular, the despot is morphed into a face, by which Deleuze and Guattari mean an identity distinct from the physical manifestation of the despot. By being signified through a transcendent face, the despot is not only everywhere and nowhere, but transcends his earthly body (2004: 127). Indeed, this transcendence is a further distinguishing feature of the despotic regime. ‘For the first time, something has been withdrawn from life and from the earth that will make it possible to judge life and to survey the earth from above’ (2004a: 211). Whereas the primitive regime is based in and from actual nature, insofar as it relates to and orientates itself from and around nature, the despotic regime withdraws from and transcends the earth. This transcendence brings him ‘above’ the actual and increases his importance. He is established beyond the earth, a movement that entails a negative form of absolute de-territorialization, and imposes himself on the earth from this beyond. Whereas the primitive society is polyvocal, the despot is univocal; only his ‘voice’ counts. As a consequence, the structure of the despotic regime is different from the primitive, insofar as a) far from taking its cue from nature, it takes its cue from the despot; with the consequence that b) the despot is the central hub of the system. Everything else radiates out from him and returns to this central spot. This fundamental restructuring emanates from and re-enforces a new socius which not only entails a particular relative de-territorialization in the internal structure of the state, but also new forms of signification.

Internally, the despotic regime organizes itself not from the earth, but in terms of a hierarchical pyramid (2004a: 212). It is, therefore, layered and, far from taking its cue from nature, imposes a structure on nature, which is orientated from the despot (2004a: 220). Its hierarchy means the despot’s position of authority is manifested everywhere with each functionary acting as a medium of and for the despot’s position. As such, while the primitive system has a flat, entwined structure, the socius of the despotic regime is ordered, hierarchized, and operates from and through a particular point, the despot, who transcends the natural order. As Deleuze and Guattari explain, ‘legislation, bureaucracy, accounting, the collection of taxes, the state monopoly, imperial justice, the functionaries’ activity, historiography: everything is written in the despot’s procession’ (2004a: 220). Similarly, whereas the primitive socius marks and inscribes the body, the despotic socius demands a different relationship insofar as the body prosthetizes before the despot, an action once again confirming the despot’s transcendent status (2004a: 225). With the despotic regime, therefore, we see the rise of the bureaucratic state. Whereas the primitive socius is defined by immediate, natural relationships of alliance and affiliation, the despotic regime is a regime of mediation insofar as the populace’s relationship to the despot is mediated through a formal state bureaucracy.

But the despotic state does not simply entail a different ordering than the primitive socius. The despotic state, as the mediation between the despot and the populace, plays the crucial role in signifying the power of the despot. Through this signification, the despot’s transcendent power is confirmed and affirmed, while the various organs of the state also confirm and affirm his power and status (2004a:215-216). With this, we see that the despot’s transcendent status means the despotic socius is orientated
around and from signification to a far greater degree than the primitive socius (2004a: 212). Whereas the primitive socius uses representations from nature to delineate particular affiliations and alliances, the despot’s transcendent stature not only ensures all signification relates to him, but, in so doing, becomes far more total and insidious than the primitive regime. Indeed, in many respects, the despotic socius is a pure regime of signification, insofar as the entire society is orientated from and to significations that reveal, affirm, and perpetuate the transcendent status of the despot (2004a: 212, 219, 233). There is, therefore, a fundamentally new regime of signification that emanates from and for the despot. The despot uses the organs of the state to perpetuate his power and status and to ensure the order of society. Through this, we see that the despotic regime entails de-territorializations, insofar as the state is imposed on the earth, and is structured around the despot who is taken to be a transcendent entity. This de-territorialization is then coded in a particular manner to not only ensure the socius’ pyramidal structure is enacted, but, through a variety of signs, including punishment, hierarchy, decoration, writing, processions, and norms, is re-enforced and perpetuated. As such, the despotic political state emanates from a specific approach to territory and the signification of this territory. Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari note that such is the insidious nature of the regime of despotic signification that it is far harsher than the primitive society. There is no rest from the power of the despot; it is everywhere all the time, meaning each individual is continuously shaped by it, a shaping re-enforced by the despot’s capacity to re-enforce his position through the physical violence inherent to the socius of the primitive (2004a: 230).

For all their differences, however, the primitive and despotic regimes share a common fear: decoding. Given they are regimes that use explicit forms of signification to create and re-enforce a particular system, they are dependent on the transmutation and transference of this system through explicit signs. Anything that escapes this coding is an existential threat to the system; one to be fought against to the end (2004a: 214). What differentiates the third socius Deleuze and Guattari examine from the primitive and despotic socii is that it is defined by decoding. Whereas the primitive regime codes from nature and the despotic regime remains transcendent to the earth to define and determine social existence, the capitalist state is absorbed into the functioning of the social body and becomes both subordinate and indispensable to the capital, consumption, and production flows that define it (2004a: 241). The state is no longer the locus of signification, but is itself a manifestation of these flows (2004a: 241). Just like the movement from the primitive to the despotic regime, this movement entails a fundamentally different socius manifested in a particular de-territorialization-re-territorialization process accompanied by a particular process of signification.

Whereas the primitive and despotic regimes are orientated around fixed, if different, systems of signification, the capitalist socius is based on the continuous alteration of signs; no sooner has one sign arisen than it is decoded and another replaces it. The capitalist system is, therefore, constituted by inner intensive alterations that go far beyond the alterations inherent to the primitive and despotic societies. It is this inner alteration that gives the capitalist system its dynamism. Just as the de-territorialization-re-territorialization process entails acts of de-territorialization that immediately re-territorialize, so capitalism’s decoding does not lead to the absence of signification, but the immediate replacement of one code with another. As such, capitalist decoding remains a system of signification based on flows and the perpetual alteration of these signifying flows (2004a: 253). Indeed, whereas the primitive and despotic regimes determine pre-established boundaries and try to maintain this territory at all costs, the capitalist socius defines and perpetuates itself by always pushing its boundaries. In other words, no sooner has the capitalist system defined a boundary than it de-territorializes this boundary in the search for new territory. With this, Deleuze and Guattari are describing capital’s imperialist tendencies; tendencies which, as Marx identified, lead it to always identify and find new markets for its flows. De-territorialization is not a problem for capitalism, but is, in fact, the means through which capital perpetuates itself. Capitalism is, therefore, an unstable system based on explicit forms of de-
territorialization-re-territorialization whereby codes, values, and norms are continually usurped to determine new territory (i.e. markets) for capital to flow into/through. This purposeful de-territorialization is, however, not an absolute decoding whereby all meaning is obliterated. Each de-territorialization-re-territorialization movement emanates from and around profit. In other words, capitalist flows, while defined by the process of multiple decodings, are defined by a particular pursuit (profit) and a unitary sign ($). Its decoding is not a pure decoding whereby flows can escape the system and travel to explore unencumbered by predetermined goals, but is always continued within a particular end. For this reason, Deleuze and Guattari call the decoding of capitalism, a relative decoding (2004a: 267). This is, however, the strength of capitalism; its openness to alternatives is what allows it to incorporate these alternatives into its operations and ends. Empire no longer entails physical land as its primary goal, but capital, which, as a secondary phenomenon, leads to physical land (2004c: 270).

But to ensure the flow of capital, production, and consumption, the capitalist socius creates and operates through a particular social organization and, in particular, a particular relationship to the state. Given that the state is subsumed within the workings of capitalist flows, it no longer controls and determines these flows, but itself becomes a flow which aims to establish the parameters and regulations to ensure the free flow of capital, production, and consumption. The state becomes, therefore, the guardian of the capitalist system rather than its ruler. The state regulates the de-territorializations inherent to capital flows and ensures they are re-territorialized in accordance with the demands of capital. Safeguarding the productive-consumptive flows inherent to the capitalist system requires regimes of anti-production, in the form of police, army, and law, to regulate activity and ensure the flow of capital. As such, the state is not transcendent to production, but immanent to it (2004a: 271, 273). For this reason, Deleuze and Guattari maintain that modern capitalist societies are a combination of disciplinary and control societies whereby all activity is orientated from and around the free flow of capital (1995a: 174). However, because any attempt to control flows invariably leads to some excess that escapes the attempt, Deleuze recognizes that codes leak away into alternatives (2004b: 254). For this reason, it is precisely in the decoding actions of capitalism that Deleuze detects the possibility for another socius, one which, rather than being confined within predetermined boundaries, is free to explore alternative directions, options, and actions (1987a: 110; 2004c: 270). In other words, the overcoming of the capitalist socius emanates from capitalism itself. While there is, admittedly, far more to Deleuze’s thinking on this issue than I can go into here, this schematic overview does bring to the fore the relationship between territorialization and signification in Deleuze’s thinking and, as such, allows us, by way of conclusion, to place his thinking in conjunction with Schmitt’s to come to some conclusions regarding the political.

The Political From Schmitt and Deleuze:

When we think the political from the Schmitt-Deleuze encounter we find that, while Schmitt’s and Deleuze’s thinking on the political are very different, they do nevertheless share a number of general themes. In particular, the central concept that links them is the notion of territory. They do, however, diverge on how to think the political/territory relationship, with Schmitt claiming that territory is defined from and through an explicit threat of violence, and Deleuze claiming it is defined by different regimes of signification. As such, Schmittian politics refers to the violent defence of territory, whereas, for Deleuze, it entails battles to encode altering territories with meaning. But even in making this connection we have to be careful because Schmitt and Deleuze have very different understandings of territory. While Schmitt is aware that territory changes, he places these changes in the hands of political actors who choose their friends and enemies and, as such, determine how to act in accordance with other societies. Deleuze, however, recognises that territories alter independently of political actors, meaning it is the way different regimes react, in terms of the regimes of signification they try to impose on to these ‘natural’ alterations, that defines and distinguishes them. Furthermore,
while Deleuze’s discussions of the cruelty inherent to primitive societies and the terror of the despot reveal he acknowledges the violence at the heart of these regimes, he doesn’t maintain these regimes are determined by violence; it is signification backed up by violence that determines them. Violence in Schmitt’s thinking would presumably be too explicit for Deleuze in that it doesn’t consider implicit forms of control, domination, or as we have seen, the way regimes of signification shape particular individual decisions. For example, for Deleuze, what is terrifying about the despot is not his use of explicit violence, but that the despot’s transcendence means his violence is everywhere and nowhere. As a consequence, what we see with Deleuze is that the explicit threat of violence of Schmitt is gradually replaced by implicit forms of violence so that the socius becomes all the more disciplinary and controlling the more its violence is hidden. It is this that makes capitalism so effective in perpetuating itself; its violence, based in covert forms of discipline, is underpinned by a system of signification that normalizes this violence and directs it, not externally, but internally against its own organization. It is this and not the threat of external violence that makes it all the more insidious. With this, we find that, while Deleuze disagrees with Schmitt’s assertion that responses to explicit threats of violence determine the political, he is aware that political regimes are intimately connected to both explicit and, increasingly, implicit forms of violence. But the increasingly implicit nature of social discipline and punishment means that, for Deleuze, societies are increasingly relying upon implicit regimes of signification. For this reason, Deleuze’s lesson is that the political refers to the non-perceptible, implicit, pre-individual socio-linguistic structures that define and determine political action. It is to this subterranean world that political theory has to attend to so as to truly understand the political. As a consequence, the political that emanates from this Schmitt-Deleuze encounter reveals that the political is intimately connected to changing pre-individual, subterranean material flows that coagulate into territorial boundaries which are determined and defended by violence and, increasingly, pre-individual regimes of signification that seek to give meaning to the violence used to defend state boundaries. In turn, ‘everyday’ politics is an effect of these moving, subterranean, pre-individual, social flows that uses signification and violence to achieve a ‘vision’ (which itself emanates from the pre-individual socius of each society) for a political territory. For this reason, this Schmitt-Deleuze encounter not only brings out the different notions of the political in their independent thinking, but, bringing these two, very different, thinkers together reveals that the political is intimately connected to violence, territory, and signification, which are primordially determined by the changing, pre-individual, socio-linguistic relational field that grounds overt individual, political action. The challenge for political theory that results from this encounter is to orientate itself from and around the pre-individual, subterranean, socio-linguistic flows, of which the explicit, perceptible political decisions of everyday politics are but one consequence.

References


