Abstract

Carl Schmitt’s claim to have demonstrated an unbreakable connection between sovereignty and the opposition between friends and enemies stands as an enduring challenge to the possibility of a politics that is free from in-group idealization and out-group demonization and the inevitably pernicious consequences that follow from this political-psychological split. In this paper I take up this challenge by relying on, and extending, the psychoanalytic assumptions of Melanie Klein to identify the common yet contingent psychological preconditions of this “Schmittian” connection, and thus to begin to clarify the conditions under which it could be broken. In locating what might be called the “relative truth” of Schmitt’s position, Klein turns out to be neither entirely an enemy nor entirely a friend of Carl Schmitt.

KEYWORDS: Political; Schmitt; Klein; friends and enemies; sovereignty.

Isaac D. Balbus
University of Illinois at Chicago

I. Introduction

Carl Schmitt’s claim to have demonstrated an unbreakable connection among sovereignty, sacrifice, and the opposition between friends and enemies stands as an enduring challenge to the possibility of a politics that is free from in-group idealization and out-group demonization and the inevitably pernicious consequences that follow from this political-psychological split. In this paper I take up this challenge by relying on, and extending, the psychoanalytic assumptions of Melanie Klein to identify the common yet contingent psychological preconditions of this “Schmittian” connection, and thus to clarify the conditions under which it could be broken.

In the next part of this paper I summarize Schmitt’s account of the relationship among sovereignty, sacrifice, and the distinction between enemies and friends. As we shall see, for Schmitt each element of this relationship is internally related to the other. Sovereignty entails the ever-present possibility of sacrifice: in the face of an “existential” threat to the state, the sovereign decides on an “exception” to the rule of law and the normal security it affords the subject that may oblige the subject to take the life of another as well as risk her own. The enemy that (supposedly) produces the threat that justifies this sacrifice is likewise determined by a sovereign decision: the enemy is as constitutive of sovereignty as is the exception that justifies the defense against him. Schmitt nevertheless insists that both the threat and the enemy are “real” or “objective” and thus attempts to immunize his account from what he calls “psychological” interpretations. Yet later in his life, and against his own earlier intentions, Schmitt himself offers just such an interpretation, one that insists on the central place of the enemy in the constitution of the self.
Thus in the third part of the paper I outline Melanie Klein’s account of the psycho-dynamics of the formation of the individual self for which Carl Schmitt provided the unintended warrant. On the one hand, Klein’s insistence on the irreducible place of aggression in the individual psyche enables us to begin to uncover the deep and pervasive roots of the poisonous politics that are all too-accurately captured in Schmitt’s conceptual categories. In so doing she helps us heed the admonition of Hegel to “enter into the strength” of the arguments of our Schmittian adversary.¹

On the other hand, she will also be our indispensable ally in our effort to outdo (but not destroy) him. As we shall see, Klein assumes that a) love is at least as central to the human condition as aggression; b) there is an inescapable conflict between love and aggression that engenders anxiety and guilt; and c) this anxiety and guilt typically triggers an impulse to repair the damage that aggression has done. This account of the development of reparative sensibilities locates the individual psychological potential for the demise of the distinction between “friend” and “enemy,” and thus for that transformation from an “antagonistic” to an “agonistic” politics for which Chantal Mouffe has repeatedly, if abstractly, argued.²

Klein’s answer to Schmitt, then, is the question: will reparative tendencies triumph over the aggression that triggers them? Klein goes some distance – but not nearly far enough – in identifying the conditions that determine the answer to this question. Thus in the fourth part of this paper I supplement her account of the emotional life of the child with an explicit and sustained focus on the structures and practices of early parenting that help to shape that emotional life. The result will be a more complete picture than Klein paints of the factors that encourage the individual adult to develop the reparative inclinations and capacities that resist his or her tendencies toward idealization and demonization.

The task of the fifth part of the paper will be to extend this account of individual idealization and demonization to the relationship among groups. Here I identify institutional analogues of the practices that I identify in the previous section that – along with the aforementioned individual inclinations and capacities – facilitate reparative relationships among groups. This will complete my broadly Kleinian effort to suspend Schmitt’s equation of the relations among groups and the opposition between friends and enemies.

In the sixth and final section of this paper I imagine a Schmittian objection to the Kleinian account on which I rely for my critique of Schmitt. I consider “his” charge that Klein’s commitment to the triumph of love over hate – implicit in her assumption that reparative tendencies are more developed than the tendencies toward idealization and demonization that support a politics of friends and enemies – is yet another ethical “ought” that floats inefectually over the necessarily antagonistic “is” on which Schmitt insists. My response to this charge will require that I modify Klein’s theory in one important respect. But this modification, I argue, only strengthens her overall account. Thus Schmitt turns out to be no more of an enemy of Klein than Klein is of Schmitt.

II. Schmitt on Sovereignty, Sacrifice, and The Enemy

“Sovereign,” Schmitt famously declares, “is he who decides on the exception.”¹ This means that the sovereign decision includes both “whether there is an extreme emergency” and “what must be done to eliminate it.”¹¹ Unfriendly critics of Schmitt claim to have located a fatal circularity in this definition of sovereignty, arguing that it presupposes what it attempts to explain: if the sovereign makes the decision on the exception, then his existence precedes that decision and cannot therefore be defined in terms of it. Thus there must be another mark of sovereignty that Schmitt has missed.⁵ But it is these critics who have missed their mark. When Schmitt writes, “sovereign is he who decides on the exception,” he means that the
decision on the exception is constitutive of sovereignty: the sovereign is revealed in and through the decision on the exception. No decision on the exception, no sovereignty. We might say that, for Schmitt, it is the exception that rules.

To say this is to say that the law does not. The law, according to Schmitt, can never be sovereign, because no legal norm can govern the decision to make an exception to it. Constitutionally mandated procedures for declaring an emergency can never determine whether and when it will be declared and how and when it will be resolved: “because a general norm, as represented by an ordinary legal prescription, can never encompass a total exception, the decision that a real exception exists cannot therefore be entirely derived from this norm.” Not only is it the case that the exception cannot be derived from the norm, but the norm, according to Schmitt, actually depends on the exception. This is true in two different ways. First, by definition an exception is an exception to a rule, so there is a sense in which the general validity of the rule is affirmed by the very process that violates it. Second, and more fundamentally, the sovereign exception transforms disorder into order, a chaotic emergency into a “normal, everyday frame of life” without which general norms cannot be applied. “There exists no norm that is applicable to chaos. For a legal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign who…decides whether this normal situation actually exists.” In restoring order the exception acts as the ground of possibility of the very norms it suspends. Thus Schmitt concludes that the exception “confirms not only the rule but its existence, which derives only from the exception.”

It would not be too much to say then, that for Schmitt the exception breathes life into the law. Indeed, he compares the relationship of the exception and the norm to the relationship between miracles and the lawful regularities that prevail in nature: “The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology.” Just as a miracle demonstrates God’s extraordinary power to suspend the ordinary laws of nature, so the exception manifests the power of the sovereign creatively to interrupt the otherwise mundane, “mechanical” reign of the legal norm. “In the exception the power of real life breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has become torpid by repetition.”

This opposition that Schmitt establishes between a “torpid mechanism” and “real life” points to the necessarily polemical target of his concept of sovereignty: the “neutralizations” and depoliticizations” that he takes to be endemic to the modern age. These take two different (but related) forms. One is a liberalism that “dissolves” the political into “everlasting discussion.” The other is an “economic-technical thinking” that reduces the political to a mere means to realize material interests. According to Schmitt, “the core of the political idea, the exacting moral decision, is evaded in both.”

The “exacting moral decision,” of course, is the decision on the exception, and this decision is especially exacting when it requires, as it often does, a decision on the enemy of the “political entity” that (as we shall see) perforce puts at risk the lives of its citizens. In fact there is a sense in which the decision on the exception and the decision on the enemy are two sides of the same political coin: the identification of the enemy is an identification of a threat to which the exception is designed to respond. Thus the decision on the enemy is as constitutive of sovereignty as the decision on the exception: “the political entity presupposes the real existence of an enemy and therefore coexistence with another political entity.” Thus the identity of one political entity can only be established through an antagonistic opposition to another entity with which it nevertheless co-exists. But this coexistence with the enemy – as the term enemy implies – includes the “ever present possibility of combat.”
We have reached Schmitt’s (in)famous concept of the political: “The specific distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy.” Schmitt insists that this distinction cannot be reduced to an economic, aesthetic, moral, or any other particular “antithesis.” Rather than referring to the substance of the antagonistic relationship, “the distinction of enemy and friend denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation.” Yet the distinction between friends and enemies often “draws support” from the other distinctions of which it is nevertheless “independent”: any antagonism can become political when “it approaches the most extreme point, that of the friend-enemy grouping.” What is distinctive about this grouping, then, is not the particular content of the enemy but simply the fact that “he is…the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.” It is, in short, precisely this “existential threat” that makes the friend-enemy grouping so “intense.”

Schmitt immediately adds that “only the actual participants” can determine whether such a threat in fact exists: “Each participant is in a position to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent’s way of life and therefore must be repulsed in order to preserve one’s own form of existence.” This would seem to imply that it is up to all the citizens of the political entity to decide on the enemy and thus on “the ever present possibility of combat.” But this implicit appeal to the direct power of the people to define the enemy quickly gives way to Schmitt’s insistence that this defining power lies with the state: “to the state…belongs the jus belli, i.e., the real possibility of deciding in a concrete situation the enemy and the ability to fight him with the power emanating from the entity.”

Although Schmitt argues that the state’s identification of the external enemy is the necessary condition for unity among its citizens, he is aware that that identification may not be sufficient to produce this felicitous result: “Party politics” may lead to the “intensification of internal antagonisms [which] has the effect of weakening the common identity vis-à-vis another state” and endangering “internal peace.” Thus “the requirement of internal peace compels [the state] in critical situations to decide also upon the domestic enemy. Every state provides, therefore, some kind of formula for the declaration of an internal enemy.” Under these conditions of internal disorder, “the domestic, not the foreign friend-enemy groupings are decisive for armed conflict” and the “ever present possibility of conflict…refers to…civil war.”

In The Concept of the Political Schmitt never clarifies the relationship between the internal and the external friend-enemy distinction, in part because his principal focus is on the latter distinction. But what is clear is that in both cases the friend-enemy distinction refers to “the real possibility of killing.” Precisely because of this “real possibility,” sovereignty cannot properly be understood to result from a rational agreement that is motivated by a desire to escape the dangers or inconveniences of the state of nature. The privilege that Liberal political theory (broadly understood) attaches to material survival cannot possibly account for the origins and persistence of a State that can and does decide to put that survival at risk. In the stark formulation of Paul Kahn, “politics does not put the security of law in place of the violence of the state of nature; rather, it brings sacrifice in place of murder.” Schmitt says as much when he writes that in “a world without the distinction of friend and enemy and hence a world without politics…there would not be a meaningful antithesis whereby men could be required to sacrifice life, authorized to shed blood, and kill other human beings.” Schmitt does not add, but we can, that the memory of these sacrifices helps to justify the demand for more sacrifices in the future; “they shall not have died in vain.”

Note the link Schmitt establishes between sacrifice and “meaning”: the readiness of citizens to risk killing and being killed presupposes their profound identification with a meaningful “way of life” that is
under attack and whose defense is, according to Schmitt, the only possible justification for the sacrifice the state demands: “no program, no ideal, no norm, no expediency confers a right to dispose of the physical life of other human beings…If such…destruction of human life is not motivated by an existential threat to one’s own way of life, then it cannot be justified.” 

Schmitt say very little – in fact almost nothing – about the citizen’s identification with a “way of life” whose defense is assumed to be the only legitimate justification for the sacrifice demanded by the state. What we can infer, with the help (once again) of Paul Kahn, is that Schmitt assumes that citizens of the state experience themselves as members of an intergenerational community that enables them to feel that they are part of something larger and more permanent than themselves. This feeling of participating in something infinite is, for Kahn and perhaps for Schmitt as well, the principal sense of the sacred remaining in a supposedly secular, modern society. It is, at any rate, surely reasonable to assume that the political theologian who insists that “all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts” was well aware of the etymological kinship between “sacrifice” and the “sacred.” Thus it seems fair to conclude that, for Schmitt, the “way of life” with which the citizen is identified, and on behalf of which he is prepared to sacrifice, is meaningful insofar as it is sacred.

The enemy who threatens the sacred way of life of a “collectivity” can only be a public enemy. Thus Schmitt takes pains to distinguish sharply “the private enemy whom one hates” from the enemy of the friend/enemy distinction who “need not be hated personally.” Schmitt stresses the “objective” nature of this latter enemy in order to immunize his friend/enemy distinction from a psychological interpretation: “The friend and enemy concepts are to be understood…least of all in a private-individualistic sense as a psychological expression of private emotions and tendencies.” But a careful reading of Schmitt shows that he undermines his own distinction between the private and the public enemy and that his effort to quarantine the political from the psychological does not in fact succeed.

To begin with, Schmitt acknowledges that “emotionally the [public] enemy is easily treated as being evil and ugly, because every distinction, most of all the political, as the strongest and most intense of the distinctions…draws upon other distinctions for support.” If the enemy “easily” becomes the target for emotions that are evoked by the perception of his “evil” nature, it would be surprising if hatred were not one of these emotions: is not hatred a normal, perhaps even necessary, response to evil? Schmitt might agree but go on to draw a distinction between public and private hatred, but it is difficult to imagine how an emotion as intense as hatred would not be, at least in part, an “expression of private emotions and tendencies.” So my first point is that even if the public enemy “need not be hated personally,” it seems likely that he would be.

This likelihood is magnified, I believe, by what Schmitt calls his “anthropological profession of faith” toward the end of The Concept of the Political. He tell us that “all genuine political theories” – and we can assume that he means to include his own – “presuppose man to be evil, i.e., by no means an unproblematic but a dangerous and dynamic being.” Now, if the individual is by nature evil and dangerous, shouldn’t we expect this “problematic” nature to affect the way in which he experiences and responds to those whom he perceives as evil? Isn’t the tendency to attribute evil to others part of what it means to be evil? To let the cat out of the psychoanalytic bag, isn’t the dangerous individual dangerous precisely because he projects his malicious intentions onto or into others? And, since the sovereign is of course a human being, why wouldn’t this projection of evil intentions compromise his or her ability “correctly” to identify the “real” enemy? It would seem, then, that Schmitt’s “anthropological profession of faith” serves to support the very connection between the political and the psychological that he explicitly contests.
In a number of his post-war writings Schmitt no longer contests, but instead insists on just this connection. In “The Wisdom of the Cell,” the last chapter of his *Ex Captivitate Salus*, Schmitt translates (not without modifications) the political model of the friend-enemy opposition into the relationship between one individual and another. In fact he situates this relationship within the context of an intentionally Hegelian model of reciprocal recognition. He begins by asking: how can I identify the enemy? His answer is that I must “recognize him as the enemy and... must recognize that he recognizes me as the enemy. In this mutual recognition of recognition lies the greatness of the concept.” But this is, of course, a peculiar, even perverse adaptation of that concept, since for Hegel mutual recognition entails the *overcoming* of the very antagonistic relationship between self and other for which Schmitt is attempting to give an account. Thus Schmitt ontologizes exactly what Hegel historicizes.

He is, however, faithful to Hegel’s insight that the self is constituted in and through the recognition it receives from the other: “Thus be careful and do not speak thoughtlessly of the enemy. One classifies oneself by means of the enemy. One categorizes oneself by what one recognizes as enmity.” Or again:

The enemy is not something that for some reason must be done away with and annihilated because of its want of value. The enemy is on my own level. For this reason I must confront him in battle in order to gain my own standard, my own limit, my own figure.

This means, for Schmitt in contrast to Hegel, that there simply can be no (stable) self without an enemy: the enemy is as indispensable to the identity of the individual “entity” as it is to the identity of the political entity. Small wonder that Schmitt is so disturbed when he cannot find the enemy:

The indeterminacy of the enemy evokes anxiety (there is no other kind of anxiety, and it is the essence of angst to sense an indeterminate enemy; by contrast, it is a matter of reason...to determine who is the enemy (which is always the same as self-determination), and with this determination, the anxiety stops and at most fear remains.

The great danger to the self, then, is not the “real” enemy but rather his absence: the sense that an “indeterminate” enemy exists triggers a destabilizing anxiety against which there can, by definition, be no effective defense. But the rational determination of the enemy transforms that anxiety into a reality-based fear to which it is possible rationally and effectively to respond. No wonder that Schmitt is so elated when he finds his enemy: “Eureka, I’ve found him, namely the enemy. It is not good that man be without an enemy.” Thus in the end the enemy turns out to be a friend.

The enemy, it would seem, is not only a friend of the self but actually resides within it. “Whom”, Schmitt asks, “may I finally recognize as my enemy?” His response: “Manifestly, he alone who can put me in question. In so far as I recognize him as my enemy, I recognize that he can put me in question. And who can effectively put me in question? Only myself.” When the enemy “puts me in question” he threatens my identity, challenges my self-understanding. But I cannot experience a threat to my self-understanding from the enemy unless I, myself, threaten that self-understanding as well. Thus an internal instability, perhaps even an internal division, appears to be the condition of possibility for the existence of the external enemy. Thus Schmitt not only concludes that “the enemy is oneself, I myself am my own enemy” but also comes very close to suggesting that the external enemy is a projection of an internal one. This insight, however, is foreclosed by his continued insistence (on the very same page of *The Wisdom of the Cell*) on the “objective power” of the “genuine enemy.”
But this insistence can in no way undo the damage that Schmitt has done to his supposedly clear-cut distinction between the “objective”/political and the “subjective”/psychological enemy. The collapse of this distinction would appear to justify the very psychological account of the “friend-enemy” grouping that Schmitt, in *The Concept of the Political*, attempts to disqualify. Curiously, in his posthumously published *Glossarium*, Schmitt actually recommends that *The Concept of the Political* be read in the light of his post-war, eminently psychological speculations:

“The enemy is our own question as a figure./ And he will hunt us, and we him, to the same end.” What do these verses mean…? An intelligence test for every reader of my little writing: *The Concept of the Political*. Whoever cannot answer the question from out of his own spirit and knowledge should take care not to enter into the discussion about the difficult topic of that little writing.43

Here Schmitt – against himself – appears to authorize a psychological reading of his political writings. In the next part of this paper I rely on the psychoanalytic assumptions of Melanie Klein to begin just such a reading.

**III. Klein on the Individual Self**

We have seen that for the later Schmitt there is no identifiable self without an identifiable enemy: “one classifies oneself by means of the enemy.” But if the opposition of the other is in this sense constitutive of the self, at the same time the self that is constituted through this opposition would also appear to constitute this constitutive opposition: when Schmitt “finally” recognizes himself as the enemy, he intimates that the external enemy and the internal enemy are merely two sides of the same psychological coin. As we shall see, this reciprocal relationship between internal and external enemy corresponds precisely to what Melanie Klein calls the “paranoid-schizoid” position.

Klein argues that this position is in fact the initial, inescapable emotional situation of the human infant and, consequently, a position to which the adult is permanently tempted to regress. Because even the most solicitous mother necessarily frustrates the infant she seeks to gratify, she – or in the first instance the “part-object” with which the infant is in most continuous contact, namely her breast – inevitably becomes an object of both intensely positive and intensely negative feelings. On the one hand, the infant’s oral gratification will give rise to a fantasy or internal representation of an all-giving, all-good breast – and eventually of a perfect mother – that is the savory source of that gratification. The blissfully pleasurable sensations that are later experienced at the site of organs other than the mouth – such as the anus and the genitals – will likewise contribute to the infant’s love for the “good mother” who attends to them. On the other hand, the intense pain that the infant feels when the breast is withheld, the sphincters are constrained, or the genitals declared off-bounds perforce promotes a fantasy of an “all-bad” mother that becomes the target for a rage whose intensity more than matches the pain she is felt to inflict.

Klein assumes that the libido and aggression evoked by the gratifying and frustrating features of the “external object” merely reinforce preexisting, internal sources of love and hate – which she considers to be the ontogenetic corollaries of the life and death instincts44 – thus she insists that the intensity of love and hate for the object is never directly proportional to the actual ratio of gratification and frustration that the mother supplies. In the last part of this paper I will call into question Klein’s assumption that both love and hate are innate. But even if we reject this assumption, there remains a good Kleinian reason for the
disproportion between the intensity of that love and hate and the actual treatment the child receives at the hands of its mother. Since the infant experiences its own feelings of love and hate as coming from the mother’s breast – because it projects its inner libidinal and aggressive states onto (what it does not yet recognize as) the outer world – the breast is endowed with far more goodness and badness than it actually possesses: “[a]n inner world…is built up in the child’s unconscious mind, corresponding to his actual experiences…and yet altered by his own phantasies and impulses.” Thus the breast of even the most loving mother will become the fantasied target of vicious (counter) attacks designed to protect the infant from its (fantasied) attacks. Eventually the infant will make full use of all the physical means at its disposal: its fantasies will include oral, anal, and genital attacks on the bad breast “aimed at the annihilation of the object.” The rage that motivates these counterattacks, moreover, will in turn be projected onto the bad breast, leading to yet further fears of annihilation: “the ‘bad breast’ is…introjected, and this intensifies…the internal danger situation; this leads to an increased urge on the part of the ego to deflect (project) internal dangers…into the external world.” And so on. In short, at this point the infant is trapped in a vicious circle of projected and introjected aggression and the acute and persistent “persecutory anxiety” that cannot but accompany that circle. Hence Klein’s initial description of this position as the “paranoid position.”

But the term on which she eventually settled was the “paranoid-schizoid position.” In its earliest months the infant has no way of knowing that the mother of gratification and the mother of frustration are in fact the same person. Lacking what cognitive developmental psychologists call “object permanence” – in this case the capacity to recognize that one and the same “object” can be the source of such radically different stimuli as intense pleasure and intense pain – the infant does not realize that the target of its worshipful love and the target of its virulent rage are one and the same. Thus the infant’s reality is “schizoid,” that is, radically split between the fantasy of a benevolent, all-good breast and the fantasy of a malevolent, all-bad breast. This splitting of reality – or rather this split experience of reality, since it is the result of the infant’s cognitive immaturity and not its agency – is both the source of the infant’s security and of all the emotional dangers to which it may eventually succumb.

On the one hand, the fact that his or her fantasy or internal representation of an all-good breast is unsullied by any contact from the all-bad breast means that there is a libidinal source for that trust in a loving reality on which his or her subsequent capacity to give and receive love will depend:

Under the dominance of oral impulses, the breast is instinctively felt to be the source of nourishment and therefore, in a deeper sense, of life itself. This mental and physical closeness to the gratifying breast in some measure restores…the lost prenatal unity with the mother and the feeling of security that goes with it…The good breast is taken in and becomes part of the ego, and the infant who was first inside the mother now has the mother inside himself.

Introjection of an all-good breast, in short, is essential for good object relations; it is “the foundation of all love relations in life.”

On the other hand, and as we shall see, once the infant develops the cognitive capacity to confront the challenges of what Klein calls the “depressive position” it will be tempted to revert to the paranoid-schizoid position and to make use of its sadistic weapons for purely defensive, and ultimately self-destructive purposes. Thus the paranoid-schizoid position is both the foundation for, and the chief obstacle to, the further emotional development of the child.
For Klein there can be no splitting of the object “without a corresponding splitting taking place within the ego.” This follows from her assumption that the ego is formed through the introjection of the object. That is, she assumes that the sense of self is the product of the fantasied experiences and associated internal representations of the (m)other. Thus the experience and internal representation of an all-good breast/mother will give rise to the experience and internal representation of an all-good self, and the experience and internal representation of an all-bad breast/mother will engender the experience and internal representation of an all-bad self. To put this another way, because the infant does not initially distinguish clearly between self and (m)other, when that distinction begins to develop the all-good and all-bad feeling-states that preceded the development of that distinction are easily transferred from (m)other to self and from self to (m)other.

When the child develops the cognitive capacity to recognize that the good and bad mothers are in fact one and the same – Klein dates this development to the third or fourth month of the first year of life but we now know that object permanence typically does not begin to develop until the last third or even quarter of that year and is usually not solidified until the middle of the second – he is faced with the terrifying consequences of his murderous rage. Not yet able to distinguish between fantasy and reality, the “omnipotent” child fears that it has destroyed the very being to whom it is so ardently attached and who is the source of all its worldly comfort and security. This profound “depressive anxiety,” Klein argues, is normally associated with an equally pronounced sense of guilt. Depressive guilt, according to Klein, entails genuine concern or “pity” for the mother and “remorse” for having harmed her. Thus for Klein “there is no guilt without love.”

Depressive guilt, in turn, is the trigger for “an over-riding urge to preserve, repair, or revive the loved object,” which Klein variously calls the “drive” or “tendency to make reparation.” On the fate of this drive or tendency the entire subsequent development of the child (and adult) will depend. If the child’s reparative efforts are matched by the mother’s reassuring responses (and, Klein adds, if the child’s paranoid-schizoid tendencies are not too strong), then a benign cycle of love given in return for love will be established and the child will be able to overcome his or her fears of having irretrievably destroyed the mother. The relief that results from the recognition that the real mother has survived his assaults, moreover, will help him to bear – to mourn – the painful loss of the perfect fantasy mother that also necessarily accompanies the recognition of her imperfect reality. Thus the successful negotiation of the depressive position culminates in the child’s recognition that the mother is neither all-good nor all-bad and therefore worthy of care. This integration of love and hate for the mother simultaneously entails the integration of love and hate for the self; the overcoming of the split within the self goes hand-in-hand with the overcoming of the split within the object: “[I]t is not only an object about whom guilt is experienced but also parts of the self which the subject is driven to repair or restore.” Thus the depressively integrated individual is prepared for relationships with self and others that are based on a realistic appreciation of the inevitability of ambivalence within these relationships. Otherwise put, she has learned that genuinely mutual recognition between individuals is possible even in the face of the (often intense) differences between them.

But the lesson of depressive integration is not easily learned. The very depressive anxiety and guilt that encourage reparations may also trigger defenses against the need to make them. Chief among these defenses are idealization and what Klein calls “manic denial.” Idealization wards off depressive anxiety and guilt with the fantasy of a mother who is too perfect ever to have been the object of the infant’s rage. Thus the task of overcoming the split between the good mother and the bad mother is postponed though the
effective denial of the existence of the latter. In manic denial, in contrast, the child defends against depressive anxiety and guilt not by idealizing but by denigrating the mother; she denies her need for and love of the mother and treats her instead as an object of contempt and omnipotent control. In this case an exclusively demonizing fantasy short-circuits the process of mending the split between the good and bad mother. But common to both idealization and manic denial is the resort to effectively paranoid-schizoid defenses to ward off depressive anxiety and guilt.

Thanks to Klein we can now locate Schmitt’s account of the creation of the individual enemy entirely within the confines of the paranoid-schizoid position. According to that account, you will recall, the rational determination of the enemy transforms the intense and disorienting anxiety evoked by the “sense [of] an indeterminate enemy” into “at most” a realistic fear that is not only far less threatening to the sense of self but actually serves to consolidate it. Schmitt assumes, in other words, that the individual who is without an identifiable external enemy will inevitably be haunted by the feeling that someone is out to get him, someone for whom he cannot properly prepare because he does not know who it is. From a Kleinian point of view, this spectral sense of an “indeterminate enemy” can only be a “bad” internal object – a feared and unwanted part of the self – and the “rational” determination of the “external” enemy can only be a projection of that bad internal object onto or into an external object that is designed to alleviate the persecutory anxiety from which the self suffers.

Schmitt argues, in effect, that this process of projection does in fact do what it is designed to do: transform a malignant (because unrealistic) anxiety into a benign (because) realistic fear. But there are both good Schmittian and Kleinian reasons to think that this argument is a piece of wishful thinking. For one, Schmitt himself insists that the determination of the enemy is no easy task, and that it is in fact always possible that he has been misidentified: how can the self ever be certain that he has correctly identified the “genuine enemy”? Thus the problem of the “indeterminacy” of the enemy – and the problem of the anxiety that necessarily accompanies it – is not so easily solved and may in fact be insoluble.

Klein would argue that it is, for – as we have seen – projected bad objects are inevitably (re)introjected by the very self that had tried so hard to get rid of them. Reconsider Schmitt’s claim that when the enemy “puts me in question” I necessarily “put myself in question.” To say that I “put myself in question” when he “puts me in question” is to say that I allow his “classification” of me to help “classify” myself: I take in, or introject, his sense of me in order to consolidate my sense of self. The projected bad (internal) object thus returns to me in the form of a hostile challenge with which I must contend. This, at any rate, is a plausible Kleinian interpretation of the encounter with the “external” enemy through which I discover that “I myself am my own enemy.” And, if there is an enemy within me it must (once again) find an external target.

Thus Schmitt’s account of the determination of and by the enemy can be translated into a description of the vicious cycle of projection and introjection that characterizes the paranoid-schizoid position: just as the infant who projects its rage onto the bad breast introjects that projected rage in the form of a dangerous (anxiety-producing) internal object which it must, in turn, outwardly project, so the “adult” who has failed to negotiate (or never even reached) the depressive position needs an “external” enemy to contain an otherwise self-destructive aggression, which aggression inevitably returns to him, i.e., is introjected, in the form of a persecutory anxiety against which he must defend with renewed aggression against his ostensibly external enemy. This translation demonstrates what might be called the “relative truth” of Schmitt’s theoretical argument: if Schmitt’s account of the constitution of the individual enemy can be assimilated to Klein’s account of the paranoid-schizoid position, and the paranoid-schizoid position...
(as Klein argues) is a permanent part of the human condition – a position in which we begin our lives and to which we are therefore often tempted to return – then it follows that Schmitt’s account has likewise captured a deep and disturbing truth about that condition. In short, Klein agrees with Schmitt that man is indeed a “dangerous being.”

But only as long as he remains in – or reverts to – the paranoid-schizoid position. We have seen that Klein argues that that emotional position is normally succeeded by a position in which the self needs neither external nor internal enemies because it has learned to integrate rather than split off its love and its hate. The self that has learned to integrate its love and hate is a self whose aggression is tempered by its reparative sensibilities and capacities. Here the operative word is “tempered,” as Klein insists that it is neither possible nor desirable entirely to overcome aggression:

Aggression…is…active even in people whose capacity for love is strongly developed. There is actually no productive activity into which aggression does not enter in one way or another. The work of lawyers, politicians and critics involves combating opponents, but in ways which are felt to be allowable and useful. One of the many ways in which aggression can be expressed legitimately and even laudably is in games, in which the opponent is temporarily…attacked with feelings that derive from early emotional situations. There are thus many ways – sublimated and direct – in which aggression and hatreds find expression in people who are at the same time kind-hearted and capable of love.

The great “untruth” of Schmitt’s political/theoretical position, we might say, is that no such “kind-hearted” and loving people ever appear in it. Klein, in contrast, brings these people up to center-stage, even as she (apparently) manages to avoid the “ethical or moral pathos” for which Schmitt shows so much disdain by taking the full measure of their aggression as well. This enables her to draw precisely that distinction (although not in so many words) between agonism and antagonism that Chantal Mouffe, among others, has urged us to adopt. “What is at stake in answering Schmitt’s challenge,” Mouffe argues, “is devising ways in which antagonism can be transformed into agonism, that is, into “confrontations among adversaries [who] recognize the legitimacy of their opponents [and thus avoid] a frontal struggle between enemies.” What Klein adds to Mouffe is the awareness that a successful negotiation of the depressive position is the individual psychological precondition for this otherwise entirely ungrounded political transformation.

If the successful negotiation of the depressive position is the individual psychological precondition for the transformation from antagonism to agonism, then the completion of our critique of Schmitt requires that we identify the determinants of a successful negotiation of that position. Here Klein proves to be of little help. Writing before the rise of Second Wave Feminism, she simply takes for granted the fact that a woman – either the biological mother or a female mother-substitute – is either exclusively or disproportionately responsible for the care of the child during the first three or four crucial years of his or her life. Thus she never considers how this “mother-dominated” structure might militate against the integration that she considers to be a “normal” outcome of depressive conflicts. As we shall see in the next part of this paper, this neglect leads Klein dramatically to underestimate the obstacles to this happy outcome.

IV. The Structure and Practices of Parenting
It is of course true, as we have seen, that for Klein the successful negotiation of the depressive position is no easy task. But Dorothy Dinnerstein insists that this task is even more difficult than Klein imagines. In *The Mermaid and the Minotaur* she argues that “mother-dominated child rearing” creates a serious *structural* obstacle to the successful negotiation of the depressive position. According to Dinnerstein, the fact that the father (or substitute father) of the mother-raised child is “innocent of the association with the inevitable griefs of infancy,” and is therefore available as a “blameless” refuge from the mother, enables both the boy and the girl to “dodge the work of healing the split between good and bad feelings toward the first parent.”

The direction of the dodge differs, however, depending on the gender of the child. The boy’s depressive anxiety is compounded by his anxiety over the difference between his mother’s gender and his own. He not only fears that he has permanently destroyed the mother he so desperately needs but is also unable to acknowledge that he needs her without feeling like a girl. Ordinarily the boy relieves both his depressive and his gender anxiety by “dis-identifying” from his mother and identifying with his father, that is, by simultaneously denying his dependence on her and affirming that he is a “man” like him. This paternal identification prepares the boy for participation in a masculine world within which his still intensely ambivalent feelings toward his mother can be kept safely under control. Thus the emotional stage is set for his treatment of the women who come to represent her as objects from which he will attempt to establish a “principled…more or less derogatory distance.” Maintaining this distance typically requires the exclusion of women from positions of public power and prestige. Thus do men seek to ensure that they will never again have to encounter the female authority they so painfully experienced as children within their families. Manic denial (of their dependence on women) is, in other words, the path of retreat from the depressive position taken by most mother-raised men.

The mother-raised girl will also find it difficult, if not impossible, to attain this position. Her depressive anxiety is exacerbated by problems resulting from the *identity* between her gender and the gender of her mother. Because the girl’s early, “pre-Oedipal” identification with her mother is experienced as the source of, rather than an obstacle to, her sense of herself as female, that identification will normally be both more intense and more persistent than her brother’s. The difficulty for the girl is precisely that – unlike the boy – she cannot rely on any obvious physical difference to help disentangle herself from a relationship with her mother that is even more overwhelming than his. What she can and usually does do it to “transfer to the father…much of the weight of [her] positive feelings [toward her mother], while leaving the negative ones mainly attached to their original object.” By transforming the split between the “good mother” and the “bad mother” into the split between the “bad mother” and the “good father,” the girl “gains a less equivocal focus for her feelings of pure love, and feels freer to experience her grievances against her mother without fear of being cut off altogether from…a magic, animally loved, parental being.” But the price she eventually pays for falling in love with her father is a “worshipful, dependent stance toward men” to whom she will sacrifice her agency in order to repudiate her mother’s. Thus are women psychologically prepared to submit to the very men who are emotionally committed to dominating them.

It follows from Dinnerstein’s diagnosis of the “traditional symbiotic emotional equilibrium” between women and men that co-parenting is the only possible treatment for this problem. When men come to participate with women as equal partners in the process of gratifying and frustrating the vital needs of their infants and young children, fathers will join mothers as the object of both their love and their hate. With mothers no longer the exclusive target of infantile rage, women would “stop serving as scapegoats…for human resentment of the human condition.” With fathers no longer available as an “apparently blameless category of person” to which children can turn to evade their intense ambivalence,
“split off feelings of love and anger... would have to be integrated within each individual person.”

Thus co-parenting would open the door to Klein’s depressive position and enable “our infantilism [to] be more easily outgrown.” Having truly grown up, men would no longer need to dominate women and women would no longer need to be dominated by men.

We have seen that the Kleinian message is (a) that relationships of reciprocal recognition depend on the development of the reparative inclinations and capacities of the participants in those relationships and (b) that demonizing (or manically denying) and idealizing defenses suppress those reparative inclinations and capacities and thus emotionally prepare people for relationships of domination and subordination. What Dinnerstein adds to Klein is the understanding, first, that men are disproportionately vulnerable to demonizing defenses and women are disproportionately vulnerable to idealizing defenses, and, second, that the development of the reparative inclinations and capacities that enable people to defeat these gender-related defenses depends decisively on a fundamental change in the structure of child rearing that Klein takes for granted (and that has prevailed in every known culture up to this point in time). Dinnerstein acknowledges, however, that even with this transformation to co-parenting “it is possible... that we will prove unable to marshal the strength for [depressive] integration.”

Thus she understands co-parenting as a necessary but not necessarily sufficient condition for the successful negotiation of the depressive position. Indeed, I will argue that unless the transformation in the structure of parenting she envisions is accompanied by what Donald Winnicott calls “good-enough” child rearing practices, we should not expect that transformation to have the effect for which she hopes.

Klein herself did not entirely ignore, but tended rather to underestimate, the role of child rearing practices in either hindering or facilitating the development of the child’s reparative tendencies and thus the depressive integration that both depends on and results from them. Although she insists that “a good relation to its mother and to the external world helps the baby to overcome its early paranoid anxieties” and thus to eventually work though the depressive position, she is noticeably vague about the precise meaning of a “good relation” to the mother. Here Winnicott is of considerable help. He argues that “good-enough” mothering – which includes “holding” the child in order to facilitate the formation of a coherent, basic sense of self, “mirroring” the child’s autonomous efforts in order to foster an initially grandiose sense of agency, and “optimally frustrating” the child in order eventually to reduce that sense of agency to more realistic dimensions – is a prerequisite for the child’s ability to integrate his or her love and hate for the mother. I will consider each of these dimensions of (what Winnicott assumes is an exclusively) maternal care in the order in which I have introduced them.

1. Holding

Winnicott employs this term “to denote not only the actual physical holding of the infant, but also the total environmental provision” during the period when the infant “has not separated out a self from the maternal care on which there exists absolute dependence in a psychological sense.” At this, the earliest stage of post-natal life, the infant is entirely dependent on the mother to protect it from unpredictable “impingements” from the world that would disrupt its “continuity of being” and thus preclude the formation of a stable sense of self: “the holding environment... has as its main function the reduction to a minimum of impingements to which the infant must react with resultant annihilation of personal being.” In other words, a mother who responds lovingly, predictably, and quickly to, and even anticipates, the needs of her infant encourages the experience of a safe world in which it has a secure place. In contrast, the improperly “held” infant who has not been protected from disturbing environmental “impingements” will suffer a debilitating anxiety that prevents it from trusting either the world or the self. In Kleinian terms, an infant
who has been properly held will be able to form an internal representation of a “good mother” (and thus eventually of a “good self”) that will eventually motivate the child to make reparations to her for the harm he will inevitably do to her, whereas the improperly held infant who lacks an internal representation of a good mother will become a child (an later an “adult”) who lacks both the inclination and the capacity to make reparations. This is the sense in which the successful negotiation of the depressive position depends decisively on the quality of maternal – but we should say parental – holding.

2. Mirroring

The same is true of what Winnicott calls “mirroring.” The child’s confidence in his creative capacities – his sense of himself as an agent able to affect the world – will only flourish, Winnicott argues, if his mother reflects back to him (with a smile or the glint of her eyes) her pride in his early efforts to explore that world. Thus the “creative capacity” of children whose efforts are not mirrored or recognized by their mothers – children with a “long experience of not getting back what they are giving” – will eventually “atrophy.” More specifically: if their efforts are met by a mother who is emotionally absent they will associate self-assertion with maternal withdrawal and the anxiety it produces, and will substitute a compliant for a creative relationship to reality, experiencing the “world and its details…as something to be fitted in with or demanding adaptation.” Now, a compliant child who lacks confidence in his ability to affect the world is scarcely in a position to expect that his efforts to repair the damage he has done to his mother will be effective. Thus even if he felt “pity” and “remorse” for his mother it would be unlikely that he would be motivated to make reparations to her. And, even if he were, an emotionally absent mother who is unable to mirror her child is not likely to match the child’s reparative efforts with lovingly reassuring efforts of her own.

We have seen that Klein teaches us that relationships of reciprocal recognition depend on the successful negotiation of the depressive position, and that the successful negotiation of that position depends on the strength of the reparative inclinations and capacities of the child. Winnicott adds that the strength of reparative capacities depends, in turn, in important part on proper mirroring by the mother. Thus the capacity of adults to participate in rewarding relationships with others depends on the quality of the recognition they received as children from their mothers.

3. Optimal Frustration

Even the most supportive mother will – indeed should – frustrate the demands of her child and will therefore become the object of his rage. The way in which she responds to her child’s rage, in turn, will affect the intensity of his depressive anxiety and guilt. A mother who calmly withstands her child’s rage is far more likely to foster an internal representation of a caring mother who has survived his destructiveness than a mother who either retaliates or falls to pieces in the face of that rage. Thus through “optimal frustration” the child learns to distinguish between the mother whom he has destroyed in his fantasies and the real mother who has survived his aggressive assaults, which helps him to learn that the damage he has done is not irreparable and therefore contributes to his confidence in his capacity to repair that damage. But a child of a mother who responds in either an overly repressive or an overly indulgent manner to his anger is never in a position to learn this lesson. In the first case her efforts to suppress her child’s rage will teach him that it is unacceptable to express it and thus discourage him from “owning” it, short-circuiting from the very outset the task of integrating it with his love. In the second case the mother’s capitulation teaches the child that he has, in effect, destroyed her, which is likely both to intensify his already considerable anxiety and guilt and to increase the difficulty of distinguishing between the real and fantasized mother.
Optimal frustration, then, teaches the child the distinction between fantasy and reality and thus prepares her to cope with the inevitable resistance of the world to her wishes. In Winnicott’s words, “destructiveness, plus the object’s survival of the destruction, places the object outside the area of objects set up by the subject’s projective mental mechanisms...outside the area of the subject’s omnipotent control.” This lesson in transforming omnipotent fantasies into a creative relationship with reality is not available to either the overly repressed or the overly indulged child. The former learns to suppress her wishes and the latter never learns to adjust them to the requirements of reality; the first learns a lesson in impotence and the second in omnipotence. Neither will become an adult with a really potent – simultaneously realistic and creative – relationship with the world.

This world includes, of course, the world of other people. To participate with them in relationships of reciprocal recognition the subject must be prepared confidently to express his wishes and to acknowledge the legitimacy of the wishes of a really separate other, to treat the other as “an entity in its own right [and] not as a projective entity.” But the overly repressed individual is likely to project hostility (from his mother) onto others he fearfully and defensively encounters, and the overly indulged individual will ordinarily expect others to surrender (like his mother) to his wishes and will reject them when they (since in reality they are separate) do not. Thus does the “sub-optimal” frustration of the child contribute to the distorted object-relations of the “adult” who is unprepared for relationships of reciprocal recognition.

4. Desirable Discipline

To Winnicott’s catalogue of good-enough parenting practices I add my own entry: desirable discipline. It should go without saying that even the parent who “lays down the law” in an optimal way should expect that the child will at least occasionally violate that “law.” Disobedience is a challenge with which every parent will have to deal, and the way that he copes with that challenge will significantly affect the chances that his child will achieve depressive integration. It is by now commonplace, perhaps even clichéd, to insist that when a child misbehaves his parent’s remonstrative reaction should be directed exclusively to his action and not to his being: what the child has done is bad but he is not. Underlying this by-now standard advice is an important psychological truth, namely that condemning the child’s being evokes shame whereas condemning the child’s act evokes guilt. There is no constructive way that the child can respond to shame; the child who is shamed will either internalize the judgment that he is “bad” or react defensively against it. But guilt is something that can motivate the child, where possible, to make reparations for the damage his deed has done. Punishments that are tailored to the harmful actions of the child, in other words, are far more likely to encourage his reparative inclinations and capacities than wholesale criticisms of his person.

Perhaps it is not going to far to say that the primary purpose of punishment should be precisely to encourage the reparative tendencies of the child. Parents implicitly recognize this when they insist on an apology from their children and forgive them when that (hopefully genuine) apology arrives. Punishment that encourages an apology that culminates in forgiveness teaches the child that harm cannot be condoned but that harm can be repaired. It is a lesson that prepares them for the many reparations that responsible adults will have to make for the damage they cannot but do.

From Klein we have learned that children whose reparative inclinations and capacities are stronger than their defensive tendencies, and are thus able to achieve depressive integration, will be psychologically prepared as adults for relationships of reciprocal recognition, i.e., relationships in which the self has no
need to transform the other with whom it (however intensely) differs into “the enemy.” Dinnerstein’s hypothesis is that children who have been co-parented are (everything else being equal) likely to have stronger reparative tendencies than more conventionally raised children and thus more likely to achieve depressive integration and the adult relationships of reciprocal recognition for which that integration is a prerequisite. Finally, Winnicott – with a little help from a friend – makes the case that children who have been properly held, mirrored, frustrated, and disciplined are similarly likely to manifest the reparative sensibilities necessary for depressive integration and thus for adult relationships of reciprocal recognition. The conclusion of my Klein-Dinnerstein-Winnicott synthesis, then, is that “good-enough co-parenting” is the child-care condition most conducive to the development of adults who are free from that need for individual enemies that Schmitt wrongly takes for granted.

In the next section of this paper I extend my broadly Kleinian account of the creation of individual enemies to the creation of the collective enemy on which Schmitt is more obviously and famously focused. We will see that the group not only draws on but also reinforces the psychological tendencies of the individual and thus that we need to consider both those tendencies and features peculiar to groups in order to extend that account. Having already considered the former, the principal preoccupation of the next part will be on the latter.

V. Group Psychodynamics

Freud defines transference as the individual “re-experiencing emotional relations which had their origin in his earliest object-attachments during the repressed period of early childhood” and argues that it “is a universal phenomenon of the human mind [that] dominates the whole of each person’s relations to his human environment.” This argument authorizes the application of psychoanalytic concepts to that part of the “human environment” which is the large group in general and the nation-state in particular. In the case of the nation-state, moreover, the transference on which Freud insists is embedded in the very language of kinship with which that “large group” is almost universally figured. Whether the nation-state is symbolized as “motherland” or “fatherland,” in either case the relationship between state and subject is modeled on the relationship between parent and child. Whereas Freud and Freudians have typically focused on the paternal roots of the subject’s emotional attachment to the (usually male) leader of the state, in recent decades the psychoanalysis of the large group has more typically proceeded from the Kleinian assumption that the group is a mother to its members. What follows is one variation of this maternal theme.

I start from the assumption that individuals unconsciously experience the national group as a simultaneously gratifying and frustrating mother that inevitably evokes both their gratitude and their rage. Thus the group that is loved is also necessarily the group that is hated. The development of the group demands that its members learn to respond reparatively to the anxiety and guilt aroused by this ambivalence, that is, that they come to understand that their group is neither all-good nor all-bad but nonetheless worthy of their care. But this happy outcome is always threatened by the temptation of individual members to defend against the group equivalent of depressive anxiety and guilt, either by denying their dependence on the group (the group analogue of manic denial) or by denying their rage against it (the group analogue of idealization). Manic denial leads to an alienation from the group but often entails an excessive preoccupation with, and denigration of, the very group from which one has consciously withdrawn. Idealization creates a demonized out-group that unwittingly becomes a target for all the rage that cannot be expressed within the in-group. Thus the Kleinian message is at once hopeful and ominous. It reassures us that harmonious relations among groups are possible if group members cultivate their capacity to acknowledge, and work through, the ambivalence and guilt that inevitably accompany memberships in
their group. But it also warns that the failure to cultivate this capacity can culminate in exploitative, even murderous relations between groups. Group development, in short, is possible but precarious.

Dinnerstein’s feminist modification of Klein’s account of individual development enables us to identify one decisive determinant of this precarious possibility. We have seen that she argues that the fact that the father of the conventional family is typically uninvolved in early child care, and is therefore available as a “blameless,” idealized refuge from maternal power, makes it possible for both mother-raised boys and mother-raised girls to evade the deeply difficult task of integrating their intensely conflicted feelings about female authority. If the national “mother” likewise becomes the object of these intensely conflicted feelings, it follows that we should not expect that the group analogue of depressive integration would be easy to achieve. Rather we should expect that love for the in-group will all-too-often be purchased at the price of hate for an out-group. We should also expect that individuals who can tolerate or even embrace emotional ambivalence – individuals who have successfully negotiated the depressive position – are unlikely to idealize an in-group and demonize an out-group. It follows from Dinnerstein’s account that co-parented children should be far less likely to idealize the groups to which they belong, and thus far more likely to achieve the group equivalent of depressive integration, than conventionally raised children. And we can add, following Winnicott, that even under co-parenting this adult achievement would presuppose a childhood encounter with “good-enough” holding, mirroring, frustration, and discipline. Combining Dinnerstein and Winnicott, we can say that the development of healthy groups is as dependent on “good-enough” forms of co-parenting as is the development of healthy individuals.

But if healthy individuals are necessary, they are not sufficient, for healthy groups. On the one hand, depressively integrated individuals will be reluctant to devote their emotional energies to groups that are not structured in ways that facilitate “owning” and working through the intense ambivalence that inevitably accompanies life in groups. On the other hand, even relatively integrated individuals will be vulnerable to splitting if schizoid tendencies are rewarded by the structures and practices of the groups to which they are committed. On the assumption that the national group is unconsciously experienced as a mother, it should be possible to identify group practices that parallel the maternal practices that, I argued in the previous part, minimize splitting and facilitate the depressive integration of individuals. What follows, then, is an account of what I take to be the group analogues of maternal holding, mirroring, optimal frustration, and desirable discipline.

1. Group Holding: Community

Just as the protection of the “good-enough mother” is the ultimate source of her infant’s trust in a safe world within which it can find a secure and stable place, so to the support of what we might call the “good-enough group” makes it possible for its members to feel that they are part of something larger than themselves that lends meaning to their individual lives. This concept of “group holding,” it might be said, is merely a restatement of the communitarian claim that individuals are, after all, social beings, the quality of whose individuality depends in important part on the quality of the communities in which they participate. But what the concept of group holding adds to this by now commonplace observation is, first of all, the understanding that the ties that bind individuals to their communities are, in Freud’s words, “the work of Eros...these collections of men are to be libidinally bound to one another. Necessity alone, the advantages of work in common, will not hold them together.” Solidarity, in short, has a sensual source. The individual literally loves the group that holds her.
The love of the individual for his group, second, is the necessary condition for his reparative response to the damage (fantasized or real) that he will inevitably do to his group. This aggression, I have already suggested, follows from the frustration that even the most gratifying group imposes on its members. More of the source of this frustration shortly. For now the point is that, in the absence of loving feelings for the group on the part of those whom the group has aggrieved, we should not expect the aggrieved to feel sorrow or pity for the group that has aggrieved them. In Kleinian terms: an internal representation of a “good group” is a prerequisite for the flowering of reparative feelings for the group and thus for the group analogue of depressive integration. That positive internal representation, in turn, will depend on the willingness of the group to take care of its members when they are in need. Thus we can say that an ample and supple social “safety net” is likely to encourage the development of reparative feelings for the group.

2. Group Mirroring: Democracy

Democratically organized groups are, I argue, more likely to encourage depressive integration than undemocratically organized groups. We have seen that proper maternal mirroring engenders the child’s sense of himself as an agent, and that this sense of individual agency is the source of the child’s confidence in his capacity to repair the harm he inevitably does to his mother. The group analogue of the child’s sense of agency, I would suggest, is the member’s confidence that he matters to the group and thus that he can help determine its direction. His confidence that he can affect the group, in turn, will depend on whether the group is designed to encourage and enable him to do so. Thus democratically organized groups that recognize or “mirror” the wishes of their members are far more likely than hierarchically organized groups to foster the political agency or efficacy of their members. And the group member who lacks this sense of political efficacy will likewise lack the confidence that his reparative responses to any (real or fantasized) damage he does to the group will in fact be able to repair that damage. He will therefore be far more tempted to defend against the group equivalent of depressive anxiety and guilt through idealization and demonization than his more reparatively inclined democratic counterpart.

The same reasoning that leads us to expect that democratic groups are less likely to be plagued by (in-group) idealization and (out-group) demonization than undemocratic groups leads to the expectation that “thicker” or more directly democratic groups are less vulnerable to this danger of group splitting than “thinner” or less directly democratic groups. Whatever makes democratic citizens feel that their voice and vote matter will increase their sense of political agency and thus their confidence in their reparative capacities. And democratic citizens are far more likely to feel that their voice and vote matter if they have regular opportunities to participate in decisions that significantly affect their lives. But in a “thin” democracy in which, in the words of Benjamin Barber, “politics…become[s] what politicians do; what citizens do (when they do anything) is vote for politicians,” the feelings of political efficacy on which reparative confidence is based are hardly likely to flourish. “Thin” democracies, in other words, encourage the perception of powerlessness, and the perception of powerlessness is a recipe for resentment rather than reparations.

Of course even the thickest, most participatory democracies are obliged to rely on representation, and thus on political leaders. Whether the reparative inclinations and capacities of democratic citizens are reinforced or undermined depends in important part on the psycho-political position of those leaders, that is, on whether they encourage or discourage in-group idealization and out-group demonization. A reparative leader, as Alford has emphasized, is
One for whom the opposition, no matter how intensely fought, remains part of a moral or ethical whole to which all people belong. As part of this whole, the opposition partakes of the good: it is not simply the evil other. Such a leader also recognizes that this own group’s claim to goodness is incomplete. Thus the reparative leader encourages citizens to confront and work through their (group) depressive anxiety and guilt rather than defend against it through idealization and demonization. His paranoid-schizoid counterpart, in contrast, is a master at mobilizing exactly that destructive defense.

3. Optimal Group Frustration: Good-Enough Norms

No group can exist without norms that distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable behavior and that encourage the former and discourage the latter. Any group must protect itself and its (norm-abiding) members from other members who would violate these norms. Yet these necessary norms are necessarily a source of frustration to some of the very members who are protected by them. This is obviously true in the case of norms that are undemocratically imposed on those who are obliged to adhere to them. But it is also true in the case of democratically organized groups whose members have, at least in principle, freely chosen the norms by which they are governed. The republican principle that “obedience to the law one has prescribed for oneself is liberty” will not prevent some group members from experiencing constraint if they are obliged to follow norms or obey laws that are, in practice, made by a majority of members with whom they happen to disagree. Majority rule, in short, is a recipe for minority frustration. Although it is true that this frustration may be tempered by the prospect of eventually becoming part of a new majority, that prospect is unlikely entirely to dissipate the dissatisfaction: the possibility of a future victory is generally insufficient to salve the wounds of the actuality of an ongoing defeat.

The participatory democratic response to this problem is to privilege the democratic process over the outcome and thus to argue that members who reap the rewards of active participation in the process are less likely to be frustrated by an outcome of that process with which they disagree. Agreed. But even the most satisfying process is itself likely to be a source of considerable frustration: the patience of even the most dedicated deliberative democrat will be worn thin by endless meetings, and even the most committed partisan of public discourse does, after all, have a private life. Thus a deliberatively democratic group is no exception to the general rule that the group that gratifies its members cannot but frustrate them as well.

Finally, the fact that any large group – no matter how devoted to participation or deliberation – is obliged to rely on representatives is also a source of frustration to its many members. Even the group member who consistently finds himself in the majority will be frustrated if his representative ignores or effectively subverts the norms or laws that issue from the majority. The frustration of the represented with their representatives is thus a permanent possibility in a representative democracy.

For all these reasons, then, even the most democratically organized group will necessarily frustrate the very members for whom its “holding” supplies solidarity and its “mirroring” encourages agency. On the assumption that frustration breeds aggression, it follows that even the most democratically organized group will become a target of the aggression of its members. And, just as the good-enough mother optimally frustrates the aggression of her child, so too the good-enough group optimally frustrates the aggression of its members. Recall that the good-enough mother sets limits on her child’s aggression that help transform his grandiose fantasies into realistic agency: she steers a course between overly repressive responses to her child’s rage that would squelch his agency and overly indulgent capitulations to it that would discourage its socially appropriate assertion. Similarly, we can say that the norms of the good-enough
group limit the aggression of its members by encouraging its peaceful, but discouraging its violent, expression. Otherwise put, these norms will uphold the right to dissent but deny the (omnipotent) drive to dominate.

Just as the mother who calmly withstands her child’s rage promotes his awareness that his rage has not in fact destroyed her, thus mitigating both his depressive anxiety and guilt and the temptation destructively to defend against it, so the group whose norms legitimate dissent promotes the perception that the group is strong enough to tolerate, even welcome, his (peacefully expressed) aggression, thus diminishing his fear of the group-destructive consequences of his hostility as well as the probability of his defending against it. And norms that validate his dissent also give him more reason to love the very group against which his anger is directed. For both reasons, good-enough norms encourage reparative sensibilities and discourage the tendency either to idealize or to demonize the group: they both express and encourage the awareness that the group is neither all-good nor all-bad and therefore worthy of care.

Not-good-enough norms, in contrast, encourage either the idealization or the demonization of the group. On the one hand, overly “indulgent” norms that tolerate the violent expression of dissent obviously threaten the stability or even the survival of the group. It is perhaps less obvious to add that violence (from within) directed against the group is likely to intensify the group-depressive anxiety and guilt of the perpetrators of that violence, encouraging them to defend against that anxiety and guilt by manically denying their dependence on and love for the group (which denial, in turn, is likely to intensify the violence they direct against the group). Overly repressive norms that invalidate or demonize dissent, on the other hand, are likely to foster an idealization of the group that is purchased at the emotional price of the demonization of an out-group. Anticipating Klein, Freud argued that “it is always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestation of their aggressiveness.” What must be added is that this projection of the “aggressiveness” of group members onto an out-group is far more likely if the in-group is not prepared to “receive [its] manifestations.” If it is – if its norms welcome forcefully (but peacefully) expressed dissent – then we should expect, against Freud, that the group might well “bind” together a considerable number of people in mature, non-idealizing] love without having to find an out-group as a target for its hate. It follows that -- everything else being equal -- societies that institutionalize the specifically political rights of speech, press, assembly, and petition are more likely to achieve the group equivalent of depressive integration than societies that deny or even renounce those rights. “Counter-majoritarian” political rights, in short, counter the political tendency to defend destructively against the group analogue of depressive anxiety and guilt.

4. Desirable Discipline: Restorative Justice

Just as the parent who sets limits on her child’s behavior must discipline him when he oversteps those limits, so the group whose norms regulate the behavior of its members is obliged to discipline its members for transgressing those norms. And, just as good-enough individual discipline encourages the reparative sensibilities of the child by demanding apologies for the damage he has done and extending forgiveness to him when those (hopefully heart-felt) apologies are made, so too, I would argue, good-enough group discipline should be designed to help develop the capacity of its norm-violating members to make reparations for the harm they have caused. This, in fact, is precisely the project of the recent and increasingly influential movement for restorative justice. Restorative justice starts from the assumption that “crime” is not merely or even mainly an offense against society for which the offender must pay a debt to the state that acts on society’s behalf, but rather in the first and perhaps most important instance a concrete harm done to a particular individual (or set of individuals) to whom the offender is obliged to make
reparations. The advocates of restorative justice argue that a (professionally mediated) face-to-face encounter between the offender and the person(s) he has harmed, in which the former is personally informed by the latter of the nature and extent of that harm, is far more likely to encourage the reparative sensibilities (and actions) of the offender than more conventional, impersonal forms of punishment that preclude that kind of confrontation and thus make it easier for the offender to defend against whatever guilt he might otherwise feel for his harmful deed. Thus they agree with Nietzsche’s claim that it is a blunder [to] view...punishment as the true instrument of “remorse”. True remorse is rarest among criminals and convicts: prisons and penitentiaries are not the breeding place of this gnawer...By and large, punishment hardens and freezes; it sharpens the sense of alienation; it strengthens resistance...it is precisely punishment that has most effectively retarded the development of guilt feeling...in the hearts of the victims of punitive authority.

Translated into Kleinian language, Nietzsche’s claim is that (traditional) punishment magnifies rather than mitigates the paranoid-schizoid tendencies to which the offender has (arguably) already succumbed in the course of his offense. Restorative justice, in contrast, is supposed to stimulate both the defender’s depressive anxiety and guilt and her reparative responses to it, thus helping the offender to transcend the splitting of the paranoid-schizoid position in favor of the integration of the (successfully negotiated) depressive position. Thus it purports to contribute to the emotional development of the offender even as it satisfies the need of the victim for reparations, whether material or emotional. This is, to this point, a largely untested claim, although there is a small but growing literature that attempts to evaluate it.

There is also a somewhat larger body of literature that considers whether there is or is not an irreconcilable tension between the rule of law and restorative justice. Sentencing under restorative justice is based on the premise that the (restorative) penalty imposed should be geared to the particular situation of the offender as well as the specific harm he has caused; on this premise, different individuals convicted of the “same” (legally defined) crime might well receive radically different sentences. Yet the rule of law is often assumed (rightly or wrongly) to require justice to be “blind” to the very differences on which restorative justice focuses and therefore to treat different individuals who have committed the same (legally defined) crime in the same way. What is at stake, in short, is the question of what “equal justice under the law” means, or should mean. But that is a question for another paper.

VI. Conclusion

To suspend Carl Schmitt’s equation of politics and the friend-enemy distinction I have relied on an extension of Melanie Klein’s account of individual development to the development of groups. Klein’s account of individual development, as we have seen, is based on the assumption that love “naturally” triumphs over hate, that what she variously calls the “drive” or “urge” to make reparations for the damage one has done is normally stronger than the aggressive drive that is responsible for that damage in the first place. Klein assumes, in short, that the (depressive) integration of love and hate is a more distinctively human outcome than the splitting of the paranoid-schizoid position that precedes it. This Kleinian assumption, however, would undoubtedly be considered by Schmitt to be yet another example of a “typical liberal...ethical or moral pathos...that deprive[s] state and politics of their specific meaning.” For someone who follows Schmitt, the concept of “depressive integration,” in other words, looks like a mere
“ought” or “should” that masks but does not alter the reality of the inescapable split between friend and enemy. The completion of our critique of Schmitt demands a convincing reply to this Schmittian charge.

No such reply can be found in Klein’s writings and it is, I believe, foreclosed by her assumption that love and aggression are ontogenetic expressions of the instincts of life and death, and thus that they are both equally present at birth. It is this assumption, we have seen, that undergirds her insistence that the infant begins life in the paranoid-schizoid position, radically split between an intense love for the “good breast” and an intense hate for the “bad breast.” Unless we make the case—which Klein never attempts to make—that the intensity of love in the paranoid-schizoid position is greater than the intensity of hate in that position, there appears to be no good reason to assume that the former will eventually trump the latter. Although it is reasonable to expect that—once object permanence has been achieved—the opposition between love and hate will produce (depressive) anxiety and guilt, it seems arbitrary to assume that this opposition will “normally” or “naturally” be resolved in favor of love. As Richard Wollheim has pointedly asked:

Granted that with the onset of depressive anxiety the child recognizes that it loves and hates the same figure, who does this provide any kind of motivation for it to control hate and to cultivate love? Why shouldn’t the child prefer hate to love?

We might be tempted to answer this question by referring to the structures and practices of child care that, I have argued, encourage a reparative rather than defensive response to depressive anxiety and guilt. But an explanation that relies exclusively on these determinants ultimately suffers from the same circularity that plagues any purely “environmentalist” account: to explain the reparative orientation of the child by referring to the reparative practices of the parent is to forget that the parent was a child and thus to beg the question of the childhood origins of his or her reparative practices. Thus the “external” explanation inevitably brings us back to the “internal” question.

If this question cannot, as I have argued, be answered from within the framework of Klein’s assumption that the life and death drives—both libido and aggression—are present at birth, then an answer to it requires that we reject that assumption. There is, moreover, another compelling reason to reject that assumption. We have seen that Klein assumes that the infant’s earliest experience of gratification (that reinforces the life-instincts) and frustration (that reinforces the death instinct) are necessarily accompanied by a fantasy or internal representation of a good and a bad breast: these fantasies, she insists, are “mental expressions of the activity of both the life and death instincts.” Thus for Klein, in the words of follower Susan Isaacs, “phantasy is…the mental corollary, the psychic representative, of instinct” and “there is no impulse [or] instinctual urge…which is not experienced as unconscious phantasy.” There is, in short, no drive without an internal object to which it relates.

But this assumption that drives are, in this sense, object relations cannot in fact be reconciled with Klein’s assumption that the drives exist at birth: even those scholars who have most consistently stressed the activity of the newborn reject Klein’s claim that it is cognitively capable of forming fantasies (i.e., internal representations) of a maternal “object.” Both Beatrice Beebe and Daniel Stern argue that it is only after “thousands of experiences of…each changing with the other” that the “infant begins to schematize…this process of mutual adjustment [with the mother].” It is not, in fact, until the infant is three or four months old that he or she is able to form an internal image of any part of his or her interaction with anything, or anyone, in his or her environment. Thus the idea of a breast that is “good” because it is given and a breast that is “bad” because it is withheld—the split definitive of the paranoid-schizoid position—cannot develop
until this point. Whereas Klein dates the paranoid-schizoid position from the birth of the infant, the cognitive preconditions for this position are not established until the end of the first quarter or third of the infant’s first year of life. If an aggressive drive is also an object relation, it simply makes no sense to refer to an aggressive drive prior to this point.\textsuperscript{111}

I have identified what I take to be two good reasons for abandoning Klein’s assumption that the infant begins life in the paranoid-schizoid position: that assumption is at odds both with her assumption that love “normally” triumphs over hate and her assumption that drives are object relations. To rescue both of these last assumptions we need, then, a fundamentally different account of the infant’s world during the first few months of its life. Here, ironically,\textsuperscript{114} Klein can get help from Freud. In \textit{Civilization and its Discontents} Freud claims that “an infant at the breast does not yet distinguish his ego from the external world as the source of the sensations flowing in upon him” and elsewhere he refers to “the primal condition in which object-libido [the loved mother] and ego-libido [the loved self] cannot be distinguished.”\textsuperscript{115} Thus he speculates that “our present ego-feeling is… only a shrunken residue of a much more inclusive – indeed an all-embracing – feeling which corresponded to a more intimate bond between the ego and the world about it.” Freud makes it clear, moreover, that this “more intimate bond between the ego and the world – the infant’s feeling of oneness with the world – is forged at the breast of the mother: “the physiological basis of the narcissistic Eros and of the pure-pleasure-ego project is the relation of the infant to the mother’s breast.”\textsuperscript{116} And at least at one point he claims that in the earliest phase “there is no ambivalence in the relation to the object, i.e., the mother’s breast.”\textsuperscript{117} Here he endorses his colleague Karl Abraham’s characterization of this first phase of the “oral stage” as “pre-ambivalent,”\textsuperscript{118} that is, as free from hate or aggression.

It seems to me that this earliest, pre-ambivalent relationship with the mother can explain why the balance between love and hate is “naturally” tipped in favor of love. The “drive” or “urge” to repair the mother, we are now in a position to argue, is a drive or urge to restore a connection with her that was at one time experienced as a secure and pleasurable sense of oneness with the world. Thus in restoring the mother the child also restores (what became) the self that was originally inseparably connected to her. As we have seen, Klein also argues that in making reparations to the mother the child makes reparations to himself: “it is not only an object about whom guilt is experienced but also parts of the self which the subject is driven to repair or restore.”\textsuperscript{119} With this formulation Klein ties the reparative process to the distinction between self and object – between “object-libido” and “ego-libido” – that is, according to Freud, entirely absent from the “primal condition.” What I am suggesting, in contrast, is that in the reparative process “object-libido” and “ego-libido” can be no more “distinguished” than in the “primal condition” that ultimately motivates that process.

I argued in the fourth part of this paper that the successful negotiation of the depressive position – and thus the triumph of love over hate – depends on structures and practices of parenting that encourage the reparative inclinations and powers of the young child. My argument is this, concluding part of the paper, however, has been that these necessary structures and practices are themselves \textit{insufficient} to explain the “drive” to make reparations, and that this “drive” presupposes an original, pre-ambivalent period of pleasurable union with the mother (or primary caregiver). This “all-embracing” feeling of oneness with the world that accompanies the introduction of the infant to its world is thus a \textit{necessary} condition for the subsequent triumph of love over hate in the depressive position. All-embracing. Love only triumphs over hate because love was there at the very beginning.

---

**Endnotes**

1. To “enter into the strength” of an adversary as nasty as Schmitt – who for some years served as the unofficial “crown jurist” of the Nazi regime and never directly disavowed his contribution to that regime – is of course a personally and politically difficult challenge, but one that is all the same essential: we need to take his full measure before he can be cut down to size.

2. See, for example, Chantal Mouffe, *On the Political* (New York: Routledge, 2005).


4. Ibid., 7.


7. Ibid., 13, 15.

8. Ibid., 36.

9. Ibid., 15.


12. Thus it is possible to understand the state as nothing more than an elaborate “protection racket”: in identifying the enemy, the state performatively constructs the very threat against which it acts to “protect” its citizens, legitimating itself in the process. Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime”, in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169- 191. But Schmitt insists on the “real existence” of the enemy and thus the essential political task of “correctly” identifying it. *The Concept of the Political*, 53, 37.

13. Ibid., 53. Emphasis added. See also p. 39, where Schmitt claims that the political entity “is the decisive entity for the friend-enemy grouping; and in this…it is sovereign. Otherwise the political entity is nonexistent.” Emphasis added.


15. Ibid., 26.


17. Ibid., 27

18. Ibid., 45. It is possible to argue, however, that in the last analysis the power to determine whether their way of life is in fact threatened does rest with the citizens, since in the event of a state decision to “repulse” the enemy they will have to decide whether to obey that decision and risk their lives in war. But whether this is in any sense a free decision is of course open to question.

19. Ibid., 32, 46. Although Schmitt is aware that the identification of an external enemy may be insufficient to produce internal peace, he seems unaware of the fact that, under certain circumstances, that identification is likely to produce the opposite result. When the identity of the in-group is purchased at the price of a demonized out-group, expressions of dissent within the former will be experienced as offering aid
and comfort to the latter: the need to find enemies outside the group goes hand-in-hand with the need to find “traitors” within it. See my Governing Subjects: An Introduction to the Study of Politics (New York: Routledge, 2010), 211-216.

20 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 32.
21 Ibid., 33. See also pp. 35, 46, 47, and 48.
23 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 35. Emphasis added. See also p. 71: “In case of need, the political entity must demand the sacrifice of life.”
24 Carolyn Marvin and David W. Ingle, Blood Sacrifice and the Nation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.)
25 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 48-49.
26 Support for this interpretation comes from Schmitt himself, who in Constitutional Theory (published just one year after the first edition of The Concept of the Political) argues that “a people existing as a political unity possesses a higher and more intensive mode of being than does a naturally existing human group that just happens to be living together.” Cited in Samuel Weber, Targets of Opportunity: On the Militarization of Thinking (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 39.
28 Schmitt, Political Theology, 36. Samuel Weber argues that Schmitt’s focus in his Roman Catholicism and Political Form (published in 1924) on the redemptive meaning of Christ’s sacrifice on the Cross anticipates his account of the friend-enemy grouping in The Concept of the Political: “Through such sacrifice, the ‘natural existence’ of human life is overcome, and…this overcoming provides a model for the constitution and survival of a political entity….The other as death-bringing enemy…emerges, paradoxically if not dialectically, as the enabling condition of a [community] life that sustains itself through self-sacrifice.” Weber, Targets of Opportunity, 40.
29 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 28, 29.
31 Ibid., 27.
33 Ibid., 58, 61.
34 This work was written during Schmitt’s nearly two-year internment following World War II. He was interrogated about his possible intellectual contributions to Nazi war crimes but was never prosecuted.
36 Cited in Meier, The Lesson of Carl Schmitt, 45.
38 This passage from his private post-war notebook is cited in Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 113. It begins with a reference to Kafka: “Franz Kafka could have written a novel: The Enemy.”
39 This passage from Schmitt’s posthumously published Glossarium, cited in Meier, The Lesson of Carl Schmitt, 52.
Cited in Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, 162. After “Only myself” Schmitt adds “or my brother. That’s it.” For an interpretation of this addition, see Derrida, pp. 163-64 and Meier, The lesson of Carl Schmitt, p. 46.

This formulation is Derrida’s, in The Politics of Friendship, 163.

Cited in Meier, The Lesson of Carl Schmitt, 45.

Cited in Meier, The Lesson of Carl Schmitt, 44. The verses are from Schmitt’s friend and poet Theodor Daubler.


Actually my formulation is a modification of Klein’s, for whom splitting depends both on the active agency of the infant and to the fact that “the early ego largely lacks coherence.” Melanie Klein, Envy and Gratitude, 253. But, it seems to me, it is precisely the absence of the latter – the absence of “object permanence – that rules out the presence of the former. This problem is but one example of Klein’s tendency to attribute to much cognitive capacity to the infant too soon. For others see below, part VI.

Klein, in Envy and Gratitude, 178-79. Thus Klein suggests not only that there is an intimate bond between nursing infant and mother but also that that bond is an extra-uterine continuation of the eminently physiological connection between fetus and mother in the womb.


Of course it is only by virtue of the gradual development of the self-other distinction that the processes of introjection and projection described above become possible. Thus the relationship between introjection/projection and the formation of the distinction between self and object must be understood as mutually constitutive.

Jean Piaget and Barbel Inhelder, The Psychology of the Child (New York: Basic Books, 1975). Although Klein premature dates the onset of the depressive position she also emphasizes that “the working through of the persecutory and depressive positions extends over the first few years of childhood.” Envy and Gratitude, 15. According to Petot’s painstaking, comprehensive reconstruction of Klein’s corpus, “four years…are allotted…for the successful working through of the depressive position.” Melanie Klein, Volume II, 124. See also 72.

Klein, Love, Guilt and Reparation, 227.

Petot, Melanie Klein, Volume I, 276.

Klein, Envy and Gratitude, 35-36, 74.

Klein uses the term “position” rather than “stage” in order to emphasize that depressive integration is an ongoing, lifelong task that is always haunted by the specter of paranoid-schizoid tendencies. Thus, as C. Fred Alford correctly points out, mastery of the depressive position is never complete: “it is a developmental achievement that must be constantly defended and regained throughout life in that stress, as well as depression itself, reinforces defenses associated with the paranoid-schizoid position.” Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 33. See also pp. 39 and 43.

This formulation begs the question as to why the child will “normally” resolve the ambivalence accompanying the depressive position in favor of love rather than hate. I take up to this question in the last part of this paper.

Klein argues that although idealization is initially employed as a defense against persecutory anxiety, it is—like other defenses of the paranoid-schizoid position—also “used in order to counteract depressive anxiety.” *Envy and Gratitude*, 73.


Klein emphasizes that idealization and persecutory anxiety are always two sides of the same emotional coin. *Envy and Gratitude*, 7.

“The high points of politics are…the moments in which the enemy is, in concrete clarity, recognized as the enemy. But also vice-versa: everywhere in political history…the incapacity…to make this distinction is a symptom of the political end.” *The Concept of the Political*, 67-68.

But see the concluding part of this paper for a qualification of this assumption.


Ibid., 37-37.


Ibid., 53.


Ibid., 52-53. According to Dinnerstein, the idealization of the father is the typical, but not the only, solution available to the girl. Over-idealizing the mother or projecting bad feelings onto the father are other possibilities, but these options run counter to the “traditional emotional equilibrium that is thought of as ‘heterosexual adjustment’” (52).

Ibid., 52.

Ibid., 234.

Ibid., 189, 134. But see below for a qualification of this (perhaps overly optimistic) “would have to be integrated” expectation.

Ibid., 191.

Ibid., 152, n. 22.

Phyllis Grosskurth, *Melanie Klein: Her World and Her Work* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 450; Alford, *Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory*, 31-50. Klein never clearly connects her parenting recommendations to the central challenge of the depressive position, namely the integration of love and hate. The privileging of fantasy over reality of which she has been accused is revealed, I think, in her failure to explain how the practices she (vaguely) endorses influence the fantasies of the child and thus help him to respond reparatively rather than defensively to his depressive anxiety and guilt.

Klein, *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis*, 306. See also p. 313, where she argues that “the visible mother…provides continual proofs of what the ‘internal mother’ is like, whether she is loving or angry, helpful or revengeful.”


Ibid, 46, 47.


Ibid., 65.
I have argued elsewhere that the commitment to good-enough co-parenting would also have to include a reform of the many – economic, institutional, and cultural – conditions that currently stand in the way of the realization of this child-care ideal. A movement to transform the prevailing structure and practices inside the family can only be as successful as a movement to transform the structures and practices outside the family that support those inside it. See Isaac D. Balbus, *Marxism and Domination: A Neo-Hegelian, Feminist Psychoanalytic Theory of Sexual, Political and Technological Liberation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 382-84, as well as my *Emotional Rescue: The Theory and Practice of a Feminist Father* (New York: Routledge, 1998), passim.


See, for example, Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1959).

The fact that the nation-state is sometimes figured as a father does not call this assumption into question. From a Kleinian – and especially Dinnersteinian – point of view, feelings about the father are typically a displacement of feelings originally directed toward the mother. Freud argued that “the great majority of people have a strong need for authority which they can admire, to which they can submit, and which dominates or even ill-treats them,” and identified this need a “longing for the father that lives in each of us from his childhood days.” *Moses and Monotheism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939), 172. Dinnerstein’s claim, in contrast, is that this “longing for the father” is not an original longing but rather a longing for a less boundless, less overwhelming, less frightening form of authority than the one first exercised by our mothers, a search for a “reasonable refuge from female authority.” *The Mermaid and the Minotaur*, 175. The question: “what determines whether this longing for the mother is expressed directly through the symbolization of the nation as a “motherland” or expressed indirectly via the symbolization of the nation as a “fatherland”? is beyond the scope of this essay.


Freud, anticipating Klein, argued in *Civilization and its Discontents* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989) that “it is always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestation of their aggressiveness” (72). Dinnerstein would amend this argument by adding “always possible under conditions of mother-dominated child care.

Thus I disagree with the argument, advanced by Vamik Volkan in *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies* (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1994), 3-33, and apparently shared by Alford in *Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory*, pp. 68 and 75-76, that group splitting is consistent with, and even facilitates, individual integration. This argument, it seems to me, renders demonizing and idealizing group fantasies immune to individual growth and the conditions that might facilitate it, and thus effectively essentializes group domination and subordination.

*Civilization and its Discontents*, 82.


A more complete account of the role of the reparative leader would also have to include the way in which he or she protects against the (seemingly) polar opposite defense against depressive anxiety and guilt, namely manic denial. By stressing both the (relative) goodness of the political group and the power of its members to repair the damage to it, the reparative leader minimizes the tendency to respond to their fear of having irreparably harmed their group by denying that they both need and love it. The paranoid-schizoid leader, in contrast, maximizes this tendency by insisting that collective political action “is the problem, not the solution” and defining the solution as the radical autonomy of the individual. See Alford, *Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory*, 94-97.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *On the Social Contract* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978), 27. Bion has insightfully captured the inescapable tension between the individual’s need for and fear of the group: “The individual is a group animal at war, not simply with the group, but with himself for being a group individual and with those aspects of his personality that constitute his groupishness.” Wilfred R. Bion, *Experience in Groups* (London: Tavistock, 1961), 131.


Braithwaite, *Restorative Justice and Responsible Regulation*.


Thus the drive and its (real) object have to be understood as mutually constitutive: “what is naively called objects plays an essential part in the constitution of the subject, including the organization of instincts as psychic phenomena; and what is naively called subject plays an essential part in the organizations of objects (not merely of object representations). “ Hans Leowald, “On Motivation and Instinct Theory,” 117. On this account of the drives it remains possible, of course, to posit an aggressive drive, since the maternal “object…plays an essential part…in the organization of the instincts” through the frustration that – after the earliest weeks or months – she necessarily imposes on first the oral impulses and then the autonomy impulses of the child. Thus an aggressive drive can be considered to be inevitable even if it doesn’t exist at birth.

Ironically” both because Freud and Klein are so often thought of as adversaries and because Freud’s picture of a “pre-ambivalent” period of “primary narcissism” is indebted to Karl Abraham, who was Melanie...

Cited in Brown, *Life Against Death*, 45-46. In *The Interpersonal World of the Infant* (New York: Basic Books, 1985) Daniel Stern calls Freud’s characterization of the undifferentiated “primal condition” into question. He infers from empirical research findings on the behavior of infants that “infants begin to experience a sense of an emergent self from birth [and that] they never experience a period of total self/other undifferentiation.” (10). At the same time, however, he also claims that the development of “core relatedness…when infants sense that they and mother are quite separate physically…occurs somewhere between the second and sixth month of life (27) – which implies, of course, that infants do not in fact sense that they are “quite separate” from the mother prior to that time. He also concedes that “pervasive feelings of connectedness and interpersonal well-being do occur during [the] period from two to seven months.” (241) Thus Stern suggests, against his own argument, that the implications of recent empirical research on infant behavior for Freud’s account of the “primal condition” are much more ambiguous than he takes them to be. But a full-scale evaluations of these implications awaits another, different paper.

This is Brown’s characterization of Freud’s position in *Life Against Death*, 51. Wollheim appears to agree. In response to his own question, cited above, about why love should triumph over hate, he answers that “in the most archaic situation of all, love in anachrist: it is a response…to the relation of total dependence. In later life, love is the response to whatever relation of mutuality it is with which the person tries to displace that of total dependence.” *The Thread of Life*, 212.

Sigmund Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* (New York: Carlton House, 1933), 137. Brown points out that Freud is not consistent on this point, claiming in a number of other writings that love and hate are given with the birth of the infant. *Life Against Death*, 53 and 328, n. 47.
