The Problem of Nature’s Spectral Haunting of Hegelian Subjectivity

Abstract

Concentrating on G.W.F. Hegel’s controversial Naturphilosophie (1830) and his Anthropology as developed in his Wissenschaft des Geistes (1830), this essay attempts to develop an intense sense of the problems that revolve around Hegelian subjectivity and its grounding in the anteriority of natural materiality. Its central claim is that Hegel’s thought offers us the conceptual tools with which to think with precision the myriad of ways in which finite subjectivity is perpetually haunted, to a degree that is underappreciated in the secondary literature, by the traumatic fragmentation that characterizes Hegelian nature. In order to develop the force of this thesis the essay first develops an interpretation of Hegelian nature that insists on the extimate fragmentation of the natural register. Subsequently, the essay focuses on what this interpretation must mean in terms of the emergence of finite subjectivity from the domain of natural materiality and therefore it concentrates on Hegel’s anthropological writings. Tracking Hegel’s conceptual analysis of the body and his bizarre yet fascinating discussion of ‘madness’, the essay attempts to develop a sense of how the natural register ambivalently and spectrally haunts Hegelian subjectivity: it is both its basal ground and the source that outlines the possibility of its annihilation. Concluding, the essay attempts to situate what such a reading of Hegel’s system might mean in terms of the broader socio-historical context of the late Enlightenment.

KEYWORDS: Hegel; Subjectivity; Nature; Madness; Spectral haunting

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0. An Introduction to the Problem of Nature’s Spectral Haunting of Hegelian Subjectivity

If we take seriously one of the fundamental thoughts advanced in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1947) then we must be willing to consider how nature, understood in the broadest possible sense of that enigmatic term, has posed a unique constellation of destabilizing problems for late Enlightenment thought and its actualization. The text repeatedly suggests that insofar as the Enlightenment project is characterized by a fear of the unknown, and insists on the domination of nature in attempts to completely remove that fear, the entire endeavor is threatened with regression and even collapse into the ‘barbaric.’ If Adorno and Horkheimer are correct then it allows us to suggest that nature constitutes a real problem which perpetually confronts various expressions of Enlightenment thought. In line with this claim, it is our suspicion that G.W.F. Hegel’s speculative system offers a sophisticated perspective from which to think the register of nature as it relates to the self-reflexive structures of thought and reason. The central thesis that we will attempt to substantiate here suggests that Hegel’s thought gives us the conceptual tools with which to think
with precision the myriad of ways in which finite subjectivity is perpetually threatened by the traumatic fragmentation that we believe characterizes Hegelian nature. Simultaneously, it offers us ample resources to think the ways in which the dynamical nature-thought relationship can breakdown and disintegrate – without lapsing into jargon, or practices, of domination. In this sense, Hegel’s thought displays a striking sensitivity to the problem of nature and becomes surprisingly relevant not only as a precise expression of the ways in which it unfolds within the contours of high German Idealism but one that might have untimely purchase within our living present as it continues to confront the enigmas of the natural domain.

Establishing our central thesis with greater precision and force, however, requires that we develop a distinct interpretation of Hegelian nature that challenges several received readings of Hegel’s writings in this context. Often, because Hegel is depicted as an obsessively rationalistic thinker, his philosophical rendering of nature is interpreted along similar lines: it is thoroughly rational. Alison Stone, for example, argues that Hegelian nature is inherently rational; it conforms to the a priori determinations of thought and therefore constitutes a thoroughgoing coherence. While this type of interpretation is textually grounded we also think that it tends to downplay, perhaps erase, that fact that there is a problematic exchange constituting the relationship between the registers of nature and thought, materiality and ideality. Such a reading, consequently, entails that Hegel’s thought has less to contribute to considerations of this problem, and, simultaneously, undermines its ability to function as an expression of its unfolding within a specific system of the late Enlightenment. Contra Stone’s rationalist reading, therefore, we intend to venture a competing thesis: Hegelian nature is unpredictable, chaotic and therefore unstable to a degree that is often underemphasized or overlooked in the secondary literature. We believe, moreover, that such an interpretation of Hegelian nature unlocks an entire series of valuable conceptual insights as to the way in which nature poses a perpetual problem for the autopoetic activity of subjectivity. We think that for Hegel’s thought to offer its most provocative and engaging insights concerning the nature-thought dynamic it is necessary to interpret Hegelian nature and spirit as internally connected while, simultaneously, antagonistically heterogeneous.

It is only in so doing that we gain a comprehensive sense of the subtle purchase of Hegel’s thought in this context: it gives us the tools with which to think how the fragmentation constituting the natural register, which somehow resides anterior to spirit’s autogenic upsurge, persistently traumatizes spirit and subjectivity to the exact extent that it destabilizes the unifying and self-differentiating process constituting the essence of Hegelian subjectivity. Our suspicion is that what Hegel’s analysis shows us at bottom are the ways in which the entire project of spirit, understood in terms of human freedom and reasonable self-determination, is perpetually threatened with collapse, silence and ultimately annihilation by nature’s fragmentation. However, this is not to assert, in the spirit of Kant, that the natural register functions as a noumenal realm – which thought finds inaccessible.

Instead, it is to maintain that nature instantiates a destabilizing field with which reason must struggle in perpetuity: it attempts to render coherent that which potentially destabilizes the entire conceptual domain and its systematic internal coherence. Nature signifies, at least in one way, how things can go utterly wrong for subjectivity and spirit. In this sense, our reading shows how Hegel’s philosophical system allows us to simultaneously think the problem of nature as it relates to subjectivity while also developing a sense of the ways in which Hegel’s position operates as a very precise instantiation of a problematic which confronted late Enlightenment thought more generally – this dual signification constitutes the lasting merit of Hegel’s system.
The emergence of subjectivity and free self-referential activity, the protean activity of spirit, from the field of extimate-material nature, themes Hegel addresses in his anthropological writings, consistently and persistently dominated his thought throughout his philosophical career. During his time in Heidelberg and Berlin Hegel lectured on the subject-matter of anthropology thirty-five times – much more than on phenomenology and psychology. Not only did he lecture on this subject-matter often but we also know that Hegel’s concern with it was so intense that he continued revising his position throughout the 1817, 1827 and 1830 versions of the Anthropology. In fact, as M.J. Petry’s scholarship shows us, much of Hegel’s introduction to the subject-matter of the philosophy of subjective spirit, including anthropological concerns, dates as far back as 1786-87 and the Tübingen seminar where, in 1790, he attended a class given by J.F. Flatt introducing the young Hegel to the relationship between Kantianism and empirical psychology. The extensive notes that Hegel wrote out on these themes in 1794 are in large part based on that class and form the basis of much of what was eventually to become the subject matter of his writings on psychology as outlined in the Berlin edition of the *Encyclopædia*. However, themes that had originally been addressed in these notes as concerns of psychology, e.g. sensation and feeling, dreaming, somnambulism and derangement, were eventually to be covered as part of the mature system’s anthropology. What these historical details tell us, then, is that consistently, over a period spanning more than thirty-five years until his untimely death, Hegel was acutely interested in the emergence of the self-reflexive structure of subjectivity from nature and the ways in which seemingly disparate scientific disciplines could be interconnected and therefore read to inform this process.

While marking its own unique space within this complex constellation of intellectual activity, Hegel’s anthropology shows a sophisticated sensitivity to a wide range of empirical discourses concerning the nature of mind in its complex totality. It can be read as a radicalization of the relationship between the givenness of natural objects in Kant, on the one hand, and the Fichtean subject’s self-positing activity, on the other, and the upsurge of spontaneous activity from the externality of natural necessity. Its analysis posits a range of fascinating phenomena which the ego, retroactively, shows itself to presuppose in the course of its fitful emergence. What the Anthropology shows us, then, is not only the significant role assigned to the results of empirical inquiry operative throughout the entirety of the opening section of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit but, more importantly, what we might call the thoroughgoing materialism that is crucial to the genesis of the ideality that is finite subjectivity. There is no subjectivity without the material conditions that make its emergence possible, which is to say, in accordance with Petry, that subjectivity is: “anything but presuppositionless.”

More importantly, and more provocatively, we intend to suggest that what Hegel’s anthropological writings show us are the myriad of ways in which finite subjectivity is spectrally haunted by the traumatic fragmentation that characterizes Hegelian nature. When we say “spectrally haunted” we mean to suggest that which presents itself as a lingering, ‘other-wordly’ dimension with which subjectivity must perpetually struggle, i.e. natural materiality. Subjectivity cannot be reduced to the *materials* of nature, nevertheless, it is internally and intimately connected to those very same materials which it retroactively posits as its own; therefore, we want to maintain that this materiality is just a real problem that haunts subjectivity’s self-actualization. Our central thesis will suggest, therefore, that the Hegelian subject is perpetually threatened with disintegration at the hands of the natural materiality of its origins. What Hegel revealingly calls nature’s *monstrosity* [*Mißgeburt*], its *impotence* [*Ohnmacht*], remains a perpetual possibility of annihilation for the Hegelian subject. Subjectivity has its basal ground in the antinomic conditions of nature which perpetually threaten it. This possibility is one of the reasons why the anthropological writings are littered with reference to pathological states such as ‘animal magnetism’ (hypnotism) and various modalities of psychopathology. Our interpretation shows itself as an alternative to several contemporary readings of
Hegel’s anthropological writings that make little mention of the threat that material naturality poses to the genesis of normative subjectivity (Pinkard and Pippin). In order to develop the force of this thesis our first objective in what follows will be to establish an interpretation of Hegelian nature that insists on what we will call the radical fragmentation that permeates nature all the way down. We will attempt to establish this interpretation through a careful consideration of the starting point of Hegel’s Naturphilosophie which opaquely declares nature is the Idea in the form of otherness. Having outlined what we take to be the upshot of this starting point, we intend to focus on several features of Hegel’s analysis of the animal organism in order to suggest that the difficulties that follow from the Naturphilosophie’s starting point permeate the text as a whole and therefore indicate what we take to be the general problem of Hegelian nature itself: its radical extimate fragmentation. That is to say, in several important ways Hegelian nature remains antagonistic and hostile towards the interiority and subjectivity characteristic of spirit, i.e. consciousness, mind, subjectivity, and the domain of conceptual thought.

Subsequently, we intend to consider what this interpretation of Hegelian nature must mean in terms of the emergence of finite subjectivity from the domain of natural materiality as outlined in Hegel’s writing on subjective spirit, more specifically his anthropological writings. Here we will attempt to outline the ways in which the natural dimension of the emergent subject, particularly in the manifold of drives that Hegel categorizes as sensation and feeling, present a myriad of problems that threaten the very fabric of subjectivity’s auto-determination. A systematic consideration of Hegel’s analysis of these categories leads us into the complexities surrounding his bizarre yet illuminating conceptual rendering of the problem of ‘madness.’ We intend to argue that what Hegel’s analysis of ‘madness’ shows us are the precise ways in which the natural materiality of the subject’s origins perpetually threaten it; they serve as forces which activate the possibility of undermining the subject’s autopoetic spontaneous upsurge, i.e. its freedom and self-actualization. Hegel’s anthropological writings give us startling insight into the extent to which nature and natural materiality remain a problem for the project of spirit in its autogenetic actualization. This must mean, therefore, that the problem of nature remains an internal component of any and every possible structure of freedom.

1. The Constitutive Fragmentation of Hegelian Nature and the Signification of Sickness

We will be able to access the problematic aspects of Hegel’s writings on nature by way of a systematic rethinking of his introductory claim that nature is: “…the Idea in the form of otherness.” We intend to carefully think through the consequences that follow from this starting point. Hegel explicitly states that nature is the Idea as the negative of itself, which means that nature is externality. He also explicitly states that externality is not to be thought of as external in relation to the Idea but that externality constitutes the very nature of nature all the way down. Hegel writes: “nature is not merely external relative to this Idea…but is embodied as nature is the determination of externality.” If nature, then, is the register of the non-thought then this leaves us no other option but to understand it as an indeterminate materiality exhibiting at its base a complete lack of structure in contradistinction to the self-differentiating organic totality that characterizes the sphere of conceptual thought and the enigma that Hegel demarcates by way of “the Idea.” In this sense, the very ground of nature is permeated not with the stable plenum of early Modernism’s Substance or the multiplicity of discrete atomic matter as advanced by positivistic science but something much more indeterminate, unstable and perhaps even chaotic.

However, if this is the case then it problematizes the ways in which minimal forms of a self-referential structure (ideality) might emerge from within the coordinates of pure externality. We take this to be indicative of what we might call the paradoxical quality of Hegelian nature: it is only through nature’s
immanent external-material movements that it will come to generate the unexpected structures of complexity demarcating living ideality. Any degree of nature’s inwardness, whether it be in terms of chemical processes or those of vegetative or animal life, therefore, must be a fought for achievement, not a guarantee in advance, because the emergent inwardization of materiality that Hegel’s project charts cannot unfold in strict accordance with the pre-established determinations of the domain of thought (logic) as the domain of nature is just the opposite, the non-thought. The unruliness of nature indicates that it must at first flounder and fail; it fights for its stability through fits, starts and ultimately abortions, all of which result from nature’s reticence to inwardness and in this sense we might describe nature as, in some qualified sense, anti-nomothetic.

Nature’s lack of structural stability and consistency is why, consequently, Hegel connects it with unreason: its immediacy and contingency have the ability to annihilate conceptual determinations and replace them with an abyssal disorder of indeterminacy such that it is perpetually lost to itself, outside itself and ultimately incoherent to itself. Concerning this problematic of nature, Hegel states: “Life is the highest to which nature drives in its determinate being, but as merely natural idea, life is submerged in the irrationality of externality…” Similarly he writes: “The impotence of nature is to be attributed to its only being able to maintain the determinations of the Notion in an abstract manner, and to its exposing the foundation of the particular to determination from without…This impotence on the part of nature sets limits to philosophy…” We read these reflections as following with the force of logical necessity from the radical externality that Hegel attributes to nature at its zero-level. Put succinctly, nature’s radical externality proves antinomic to the conceptual domain and therefore poses a fundamental problem for conceptual thought. This is why Hegel surprisingly yet explicitly states that the impotence of nature perpetually challenges what philosophy can hope to achieve when considering the former's enigmatic recesses. He writes: “Nature never fails to blur essential limits with intermediate and defective formations, and so to provide instances which qualify every firm distinction…” and he revealingly continues to state: “Even within a specific genus such as mankind, monsters occur, which have to be included within the genus, although they lack some of the characteristic determinations which would have been regarded as essential to it.” Again, it is the fundamental unruliness of nature as out-and-out externality that grounds, on our reading, Hegel’s comments concerning the irrationality inherent in the various domains of nature.

Taking this externalization and fragmentation as characteristic of the very fabric of Hegelian nature, however, has not been fully endorsed in the secondary literature. For instance, Alison Stone’s apposite reading of Hegel’s Naturphilosophie insists on a thoroughly rationalist interpretation of Hegel’s text and the implications it must have for the domain of nature as a whole. Stone reads Hegel’s writings on nature as maintaining that nature is, unproblematically, through and through coherent and ultimately rational. Provocatively insisting on a strong a priori rationalist reading of Hegel’s position, Stone writes: “Whenever I refer to Hegel’s “rationalist” view/conception/metaphysics of nature, this denotes his view that all natural forms act rationally (otherwise expressed, that all natural forms are intrinsically rational).” Stone gives a careful reading of the entirety of Hegel’s philosophy of nature and effectively illuminates the difficulties of Hegel’s opaque and even ambivalent thought throughout the text. In order to facilitate her interpretation she reads the three divisions of Hegel’s Naturphilosophie (mechanics, physics and organics) as corresponding to the developments of conscious as systematically developed in his Philosophy of Mind. What this method presupposes, however, is a fundamental correspondence between thought and nature and it is this very assumption that our interpretation seeks to question. Instead, reading quite literally Hegel’s starting point of the heterodoxy between natural materiality and conceptual thought, the Idea and nature, our interpretation insists on demarcating the real differences that separate the two registers and exploring the problematic that follows from their heterogeneity. Our question, therefore, might be phrased as follows:
how can Stone’s strong rationalist reading, where all natural forms are through and through rational, account for Hegel’s repeated claims throughout the text that nature is fundamentally contingent, impotent and in very important ways permeated with irrationality and even monstrosity? It is not immediately clear that it can and therefore the need for an alternative reading of the text in order to attempt a response to that very question. This is not, however, to suggest that our reading operates ‘against’ Stone’s position. Instead, it seeks to systematically develop what it would mean to read Hegelian nature in terms of the impotence and irrationality that he repeatedly assigns to it and therefore, as a compliment to Stone’s interpretation, contribute to developing a sense of the fecund interpretive possibilities that Hegel’s text permits. This move, to us, forms a promising line of inquiry not just in Hegelian studies but in terms of philosophical thought more generally – especially as it pertains to the problem of nature and particularly how the latter unfolds in terms of the developments of concrete subjectivity.

Having laid our interpretive cards on the table that insist on the problem that nature poses for Hegelian thought more generally we intend, in the remainder of this section, to intensify the amplitude of the problematic overtones of this reading. Nature’s unruly externality, its fundamental determination as indeterminate, perpetually forecloses on the possibility of the proper existence of conceptual thought and unified systematicity because externality continuously undermines the smooth autopoetic self-articulation characteristic of the conceptual register. In his analysis of the animal organism, Hegel writes:

The immediacy of the Idea of life consists of the Notion as such failing to exist in life, submitting itself therefore to the manifold conditions and circumstances of external nature, and being able to appear in the most stunted of forms, the fruitfulness of the earth allows life to break forth everywhere, and in all kinds of ways. The animal world is perhaps even less able than the other spheres of nature to present an immanently independent and rational system of organization, to keep to the forms which would be determined by the Notion, and to proof them in the face of the imperfection and mixing of conditions, against mingling, stuntedness and intermediaries. The feebleness of the Notion in nature in general, not only subjects the formation of individuals to external accidents, which in the developed animal, and particularly in man, give rise to monstrosities, but also makes the genera themselves completely subservient to the change of the external universal life of nature. The life of the animal shares in the vicissitudes of this universal life…and consequently, it merely alternates between health and disease.22

This passage gives us perhaps the clearest indication of what Hegel, in conversation with the poet Heinrich Heine, described as nature’s leprosy.23 Nature’s immediacy not only traumatizes individual organisms to such an extent that life is nothing more than the feeble alterations of health and sickness permeated by an acute sense of fear; more revealingly, the entire sphere of the genus is traumatized by the contingencies of geological materiality, and the teeth of animality – tearing it open. The passage needs to be read in terms of nature’s lack of internality or conceptual interiority; it indicates the impotence of nature, its inability to hold fast to conceptual determinacy, its ruling black flag of externality.

What Hegel’s analysis of the animal organism and the genus relation indicates at this point is crucial to generating a more precise sense of the macro-implications of Hegel’s speculations concerning the entire register of natural forms. Here in the very heart of life, animality, the most pronounced expression of the concept having entered into existence and achieved a sophisticated inwardization and self-referential structure, the ideality constituting the animal organism is continually and perpetually traumatized by the complex array of contingent factors that compose its factual environment. Again, we see how the defect that characterizes
nature from its most rudimentary determination (i.e. radical externality) permeates the living organism with dire consequences: it is perpetually given over to an estimate other that constantly threatens it with definitive annihilation. In this way we say that it is the fragmentary life of nature in its monstrous contingency that shows us the impotence of the concept in nature [diese schwäche des Begriffs in der Natur]. If conceptuality articulates the impotence of nature then it is nature’s monstrosity, violence and the silence of death that pronounce the inabilities of the concept to fully overcome its contingencies. Indeed, we believe that we can show that the traumatic situation the animal finds itself in is nothing but a direct consequence of nature’s radical extimacy and that the problematic implications of material externality only become more intense and precise in the phenomena of sickness and, ultimately, death.

Considering the ways in which the animal organism comes to bring the abstract determinates of its genus into existence, Hegel is forced into an analysis of the sexual relation (species perpetuation) and the ways in which nauseating process of perpetuation is checked and therefore continued. This prompts Hegel to analyze the structure of sickness and disease which we are going to read as highly expressive of the problem of Hegelian nature more generally. Confronting the genus as abstract other, the organism has two possibilities, it can either: (a) overcome that externality and incorporate it into itself and therefore return to itself, or; (b) it can radically diverge from the genus’ negative externality. In (b) animal subjectivity can diverge from its existence as dictated by the specificities of its genus. Of this diremption, Hegel states: “The organism is in a diseased state when one of its systems or organs is stimulated into conflict with the inorganic potency of the organism. Through this conflict, the system or organ establishes itself in isolation, and by persisting in its particular activity in opposition to the activity of the whole, obstructs the fluidity of this activity, as well as the process by which it pervades all the moments of the whole.” The role that externality, in the modes of materiality and organicity (vegetative), performs in the establishment of sickness, disease and pathological states in the organism is significant. The organism can only find itself in sickness to the extent that it goes over, as in the opening process of assimilation, to its negation, to its other in an attempt to reformulate that otherness within the coordinates of its own living project, transform that otherness within the horizon of its own activity. This would appear to suggest, then, that sickness is a structural activity immanent within the organism that is, nevertheless, brought about through this perpetual project of tarrying with the multiplicity constituting externality.

Our claim here then will be that the power of externality establishes sickness to the precise degree that the organism is not able to assimilate that otherness within its own project with the consequence that one of the organism’s systems starts operating in isolation from the organic whole establishing an external relationship such that the one falls outside the other (fixated diremption). Real sickness is only established to the extent that external isolation on the part of the subsystem is maintained within the very structure of the organism itself. Now, to be certain, internal differentiation, and hence to a degree isolation and externality, is a crucial moment in the overall structural processes of the organism and this means that, in a certain sense, an organism’s systems do operate in isolation and external relation, the one to the other. However, the unique problematic of illness is that this moment of difference and isolation on the part of the organ or system persists to the detriment of the negative unity (ideality) constituting the organism’s ontological structure. This signifies that in acute sickness the structure of the subject turns out to be its inverse: the self becomes precisely that through which its negative asserts itself. The negative of the self, the non-self, paradoxically, turns out to be the self’s very structure.

As the Zusatz to §371 indicates, the problematic established by sickness is that the structure of the self turns out to be a fixated disproportion between what it ought to be and what it is (existence). The organism is unable to overcome the externality of the isolated sub-system and this forces the two, sub-
system and whole, into a seemingly irreconcilable diremption. In sickness this other is not just an external inorganic entity; instead the very negativity to be overcome is the self’s existent structural constitution. Disease shows the organism at odds with itself, potentially devouring itself, which, paradoxically, is a result of its necessary interactions, its entanglement, with the materiality-organicity of its environmental context. The consequence of this diremption is that the organism finds its economy of response to external stimuli limited or reconstituted in such a way that its register of possible responses becomes restricted. We might characterize this restriction as the establishment of a pathological norm for the organism, one which it itself establishes.  

Sickness operates as an ambivalent concept in Hegel’s lexicon concerning nature. It is clear that it is meant to apply to the phenomena of organic life and the precise series of problems that beset the organism in its gearing onto its factual environment. In coming into persistent contact with the materials and creatures of that environment it is given the Sisyphean task of perpetually converting the inorganic otherness of its context into the matrices of its own existential horizon. What sickness shows us, in this sense, is the ways in which externality proves subversive to the animal’s negative, assimilative process, potentially undermining its project. When the non-I of the environment consistently remains unincorporated the animal is in illness and non-health: the paradoxically impotent (does not hold to conceptual self-referentiality) power (annihilates subjective structures of interiority) of natural externality threatens the subjective dynamism of interiorized self-relationality.  

However, it is our contention that this characterization does not exhaust the significance of the concept of sickness. Our claim is that sickness operates as the logical consequence of the paradox of Hegelian nature which begins with the failures of extimate indeterminacy that nevertheless prove profoundly generative. We believe that it is possible to suggest that there is a way in which the very extimate externality that characterizes nature as a whole can also be understood in terms of Hegel’s vocabulary of pathology. Our thesis claims that the wild externality that constitutes the most primordial level of nature is highly paradoxical in that it generates a series of material structures that exhibit even more sophisticated degrees of interiority which are nevertheless constantly threatened by the very externality that generated them. Sickness operates as the most intense and precise instance of nature’s paradoxicality before the utter collapse of this essential tension in the oblivion of death.  

Our purpose here is not to frame the natural domain in a strictly pejorative sense but it would be to venture the suspicion that at its base level through to the sophisticated structuration of the organic realm nature is continuously given over to, and dominated by, an unruly externality that can be understood in terms of Hegel’s speculative analysis of sickness. Doing so gives us a precise series of concepts and dialectical processes with which to think the generative forces at work in nature (externality as generative of life) while simultaneously allowing us to think of those very same forces as radically destructive (externality as definitive negation). Nature considered more generally is the fragmented ‘totality’ (‘totality’ because a comprehensiveness would in some sense be impossible when considered in terms of a thoroughgoing fragmentation) in which this acute contradiction plays out in a myriad of disparate yet related forms. Again, this interpretation is dependent on our taking literally Hegel’s claim that nature as a whole needs to be understood as the Idea in otherness, as the territory of the non-thought. It is through, by, and in the face of the movements constituting material externality that the very possibility of the living must arise. And it is by that very same token that we find life’s impossibility.  

With this interpretation of the fundamental fragmentation of nature and the ways in which Hegel’s lexicon of pathology precisely instantiate the problem that the natural poses within the matrices of the
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speculative system our subsequent objective will be to precisely track how the problem of nature manifests itself within the coordinates of human activity and culture – themes which Hegel systematically explores in his writings on spirit. Our wager will suggest that the problem of nature is not left behind within the boundaries of Hegel’s philosophy of nature but that it remains and constitutes one of the fundamental dangers immanently permeating the entire domain of spirit. In this sense, nature is that which relentlessly poses a problem, the problem of material externality, to more complex configurations of spirit’s activity. In order to develop this claim in more detail we move to a consideration of Hegel’s analysis of the emergence of subjectivity from the domain of external nature, i.e. his anthropological writings.

2. The Specter of Nature in the Fitful Birth of Subjectivity: Hegel’s Speculative Anthropology

If Hegel’s anthropological writings are to be characterized by one proposition, then it must be this: they offer a conceptual lexicon that maps the transmogrification of natural substance into subjectivity. In contradistinction to nature’s perpetual fragmentation, Hegel contends that the domain of spirit opens with a fundamental interconnection, a unitary power that pervades the entirety of the natural domain which he demarcates by way of the category of soul. Soul, unlike developed forms of spirit such as consciousness proper, has not differentiated itself from nature; instead, it is ubiquitously immersed in the pulsations of the natural environment. Addressing the initial starting point of spirit, Hegel states: “we are concerned initially with what is still the entirely universal, immediate substance of spirit, with the simple pulsation, the mere inner stirring of the soul. In this primary spiritual life there is still no positing of difference, no individuality as opposed to what is natural.”

Instead, soul must in some significant way take up those determinations, as it were, and restructure them, retroactively posit them as unified through its activity. This retroactive positing produces a universal and unified substantiality distinguishing the register of spirit from the fragmentation that we have argued characterizes the natural domain through and through. It minimally relates them as fluctuations, “pulsations”, which pertain to it as “natural qualities.” The radical externalities of distinct spheres in the natural setting which, as Murray Greene notes, “remain behind as particular existences”, become, in the context of the universality of soul, qualities of its universal substance. They lose their isolated independence by way of the transformative activity of the emergent universal soul, or rather, behind the back of their independent existence they come to be compressed within the unitary whole of the universal soul and, in so doing, are its qualities. In this sense, the universal life of nature is also the life of the soul. What this means, then, is that this immediate level of spirit is the most primitive level of life, existing in a Freudian oceanic state of oneness. This most universal substantiality is what Hegel refers to as the “world soul” and the ways in which spirit “has come into being as the truth of Nature.”

Despite the fact of this break with the fragmentation of nature, spirit at the outset, still shows itself in its most basic determinations as a “being rendered by nature”, it is spirit which “is as yet not with itself, not free but still involved in nature” and consequently, spirit as soul is in a fundamental way still external to itself, alien to itself as free autopoietic activity. Soul, therefore, operates as an unstable connective conceptual hinge between the fields of exteriorized nature and the self-referential activity of spirit: it is the indeterminate expression of the interpenetrating entanglement of these two spheres. Hegel writes: “In its substance, which is the natural soul, spirit lives with the universal planetary life, differences of climates, the change of the seasons, the various times of day etc. This natural life is only partly realized within it, as vague
moods.” The fact that soul, in its first determination as natural, is largely a fluid expression of the fluctuations of the environment we take to reveal the ways in which soul is heterogeneously determined as an expression of nature’s exteriority (passivity) and spirit’s internality (activity). This interpenetrating tension activated in the soul between liberated self-referential subjectivity and extimate substantial origins will permeate the entirety of the Anthropology in the sense that subjectivity is, at these stages, in the process of emerging from its overdetermination by the externality of nature.

The anthropological writings as a whole, therefore, chart the developments of spirit as it mutates from universal substantality towards finite subjectivities. Overall, the text conceptually traces this developmental process in three different sections: “natural soul”, “feeling soul”, and “actual soul.” Each charting in its own way the progressive and intensifying power of spirit as it internally transforms the plenum of its substantial being, refining it within the contours of various self-referential structures that ultimately open the way to the simple ideal structure of the abstract ego, the genetic epicenter of subjectivity proper. Our primary objective in the remainder of this section will be a sustained effort to develop a precise sense of the various ways in which the fragmentation of nature’s externality persistently threatens the development of finite subjectivity, a threat which becomes most explicit in Hegel’s analysis of psychopathology, or, ‘madness.’ In this sense, we will attempt to show how nature, within the very coordinates of the register of spirit, remains a perpetual problem for the reconstructive activity of spirit. Spirit, therefore, is never fully liberated from nature as such but, much more interestingly, is engaged in a perpetual dynamical tension within it. It is only in terms of the struggle with nature that spirit is actualized as such. Spirit then is a project that is perpetually haunted and spurred onward by nature’s insistent exteriority; natural exteriority retains the constant ability to break loose of spirit’s agency, to undermine the latter’s reconstructive activity. Such pathological states, therefore, would operate as spirit’s regression to a logically inferior state (i.e. exteriority).

2.1 The Psychosomatic Interface of the Corporeal Body: Gearing onto the Factical World

Hegel’s speculative inquiry into the origins of concrete subjectivity begins by way of an analysis of the ‘natural soul’ which denotes the individual as ensnared in the fluctuations of its natural environment: it displays an intense unity with its factual situation because, at this point in its development, it is not yet self-determining, a subjective-centre of autopoietic activity (consequently, it can barely be called individual). Inchoate spirit discovers the fluctuations of the natural situation in which it is factically thrown by way of its sensible body, an interpenetrating psycho-somatic interface. Concerning sensibility, Hegel writes:

Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring, the inarticulate breathing, of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality, where every definite feature is still immediate – neither specially developed in its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject, but treated as belonging to its most special, its natural peculiarity. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient, belonging as it does to natural, immediate being – to what is therefore qualitative and finite.

As Catherine Malabou states, in sensibility we witness how the soul of nature transforms into the nature of the soul, and in this sense it expresses the restructuring activity whereby nature is taken up into the inchoate interiority of the finite individual. Playing on the signification of the German verb “to find” (finden) Hegel indicates how the soul literally finds this particular content as transformed by way of the minimally mediated experience of sensibility (Emp-finding). In the sensation of touch, for instance, we simultaneously experience the presence of the external object that we are touching and our reaction to it.
Consequently, sensibility is the minimally mediated identity between subject and object. This is a unity, however, which precedes any subject-object distinction (Hegel states: "nor set in distinction as objective to subject") because at this point in Hegel’s analysis he is dealing with a domain which precedes any application of the categories of the understanding that would structure the sensory manifold in terms of clear subject-object relations. Consequently, we can speak of sensibility as the individual’s obscure preconscious gearing onto the world – to use the vocabulary of Merleau-Ponty. Lacking sophisticated conceptual mediation, mind as sentient finds itself as connected to literally everything, one is: “…virtually the totality of nature.

The economies constituting the sensible body, as Malabou notes, form a “reflexive relationship” between body and soul such that sensations originating in the world are restructively internalized and, conversely, those of interiority are externalized such that one is freed of this content (the case of sighing, for example). The Zusatz to §401 speaks of the corporealization of inner determinations as successful only insofar as they operate as expulsions (Entäußerung) of inner determinacy. The totality of the reflexivity of the sensible body forms the substantial ground from which spirit as subject must emerge and generate itself as such. The point that we wish to emphasize here, however, is that from the very outset of Hegel’s analysis into the origins of the subject we see how the individual is overdetermined by sensory input advanced upon it from the permutations of its factical environment. Quite simply, the entire interface of sensibility shows the individual as an unconscious gearing on to the world, determined by the natural materials that it takes up passively within the matrices of sentence; in this precise sense, the sentient interface of the body shows the finite individual as alive and quivering with the manifold of determinations that come to it as externally imposed, i.e. as caught in the throes of natural externality.

The more pronounced ‘interiority’ that emerges as the resulting field of coordinates from sensibility is demarcated by what Hegel calls feeling (Gefühl). Hegel writes: “The feeling individual is simple ideality, subjectivity of sensation.” Feeling introduces a more pronounced unity into the flux of the sensory manifold and therefore it constitutes a higher order (re-)structuring activity. Here then we see how in feeling the individual posits as its own results the very set of externally imposed conditions which had been their cause; spirit itself is the transmogrifying activity that takes hold of these conditions such that it becomes self-generating, auto-affective. This self-referential process just is the activity of spirit and therefore marks the most rudimentary form of spirit’s activity as it unfolds within the opening coordinates of the domain of spirit proper. Notice how an external determination is taken up and internalized within the contours of spirit’s restructive autopoetic activity: one that is, consequently, both cause and effect. Because there is minimal ordering, an activity of ordering, what is implicit here is the rudimentary activity of spirit that is more sophisticated than that displayed under the domain of sensibility. Consequently, the inverted lining of particular feeling is that every determination implicates the living, subjective, organism that has those feelings. This means there is a negatively reflected distance in every determination of feeling, i.e. the living organism whose feelings they are.

As Malabou indicates, the strength of the Hegelian analysis shows itself here in that the form must become the content of everything which it forms: the two are never wholly separated but instead mutually inform each other. We read feeling as a crucial moment in the material genesis of concrete subjectivity: on the one hand, it functions as a clear indication of the grounding substantia lity of subjectivity which is bound to its factical environment, i.e. determinations externally imposed by way of the natural milieu while, simultaneously, on the other, it offers an opaque indication of the subjective activity at work within this restructuring process. What the minimal structure of feeling shows us quite explicitly then is the continued influence of the natural register’s ext eriority within the matrices of spirit’s retroactive positing activity. Indeed, the pulsations and determinations of natural materiality enable, in a way, spirit’s restructive activity...
in the first place. Spirit, at this stage in its development, is anything but beyond the natural register but instead remains firmly bound to its exterior influence; this influence is what constitutes one of the key ways in which nature continues to function as a destabilizing dimension of spirit in its autogenetic upsurge as free self-actualizing activity. The problem nature’s fragmentation poses for emergent subjectivity becomes most explicit in Hegel’s analysis of the concept of self-feeling.

2.2 The Psychopathology of Self-Feeling: Disruptions from Subjectivity’s Natural Anteriority

The category of self-feeling (Selbstgefühl) manifests a debilitating internal diremption within the very fabric of the soul’s interiority. This acute tension eventually establishes an entire domain of coordinates within the totality of the individual that consolidate under the category of habit, that which makes possible actual soul, consciousness proper, the self-referentiality of the abstract ego. Anticipating the stability yet to come, the dynamics of self-feeling nonetheless introduce Hegel’s bizarre yet fascinating discussion of psychopathological states and the role they play in the formations, and regressions, of finite spirit. The richness of these passages permit several different readings simultaneously. Some of the literature has concentrated on the ways in which Hegel’s analysis of mental illness serves as a tacit criticism of Romanticism in general and particular representatives of that movement, e.g. Novalis (Reid); others, in a related approach, have argued that Hegel’s theory is informed by his personal contact with mental illness by way of his sister (Berthold-Bond and the poet Holderlin (Olsen)); still others have developed readings of Hegel’s account of self-feeling which interpret the problems of psychopathology in terms of a fixated feeling which the subject cannot properly place and by which it is therefore dominated (DeVries and Greene); still others have connected Hegel’s writings in this context to anticipate Freudian metapsychology and its concept of the unconscious (Mills).

Acknowledging the importance of these approaches to Hegel’s writings on mental illness, we intend to interpret Hegel’s analysis of the most intense forms of psychopathology as accentuating the ways in which the domain of feeling soul, understood as the unconscious ground of the individual, is unable to properly situate, not just a feeling, but its feeling-of-self as a minimal surplus that is both identical with, and yet, not solely identical with the particulars of the sentient manifold. The negative potency of identification and difference tracked in self-feeling simultaneously reveals the soul’s ability to hold fast to any one of its determinations that it both is, in the sense that it is its feeling, and, simultaneously, is not, in the sense that the total individual is not solely that feeling. The ambivalence of this contradiction is highly significant for Hegel’s analysis and from it we will attempt to develop our central thesis: Hegel’s analysis shows us the ways in which the subject might be traumatized by particular determinations of self-feeling that come to it by way of exteriority with which the soul indentifies in the isolated interiority of feeling. We take this to indicate the myriad of ways in which the fragmentation characteristic of the natural register serves as perpetual threats to finite subjectivity because the sentient content that protrudes from consciousness in psychopathological states ultimately comes to it from outside and remains, in some key sense, external to the mediated totality of consciousness proper and this is why Hegel repeatedly frame psychopathology in terms of division (Urteil). In this precise sense, it is the externality of the natural realm that proves a crucial dimension in Hegel’s account of madness; it is this persistent externality that plagues subjectivity as unified totality. Spirit, then, forever has the possibility of regression into states which are antinomic to the autopoiesis of subjectivity proper and this possibility, in a fundamental sense, is a result of the persistent externality that we have argued characterizes Hegelian nature.

Hegel begins his analysis of the feeling soul by attempting to show how immanent within the very structure of the domain of feeling there is a negative space reflectively distanced from every particular
determination which implicates, the subjective totality whose determinations they are. The negative centre implicated in the myriad of feelings becomes most pronounced in what Hegel calls “self-feeling” (Selbstgefühl). Hegel writes:

As individuality, the essence of the feeling totality is to divide itself internally, and to awaken to the basic internal division by virtue of which it has particular feelings, and is a subject in relating to these its determinations. It is the subject as such which posits* these within itself as its feelings. It is immersed in this particularity of sensations, and at the same time, through the ideality of what is particular, combines with itself in them as a subjective unity. It is in this way that it constitutes self-feeling [Selbstgefühl] and at the same time, it does so only in the particular feeling.57

Hegel locates the internal division within the immediate manifold of feeling with the consequence that we may not read this passage as suggesting that at this stage in its development the soul has a concept of self. This nuance indicates the way in which Hegel’s analysis insists upon distinguishing between the reality of the subject matter at hand and the difference it strikes with its conceptual rendering. As DeVries58 notes, Hegel cannot be referring to a concept of self as the categories of the understanding which establish the possibility of conceptual thought do not arrive on the scene until later in his analysis of more developed modes of consciousness (i.e. the Phenomenology etc.) – developments in the speculative analysis that are here completely absent. There is as yet no clear subject-object distinction with the world over and against consciousness; instead, the stirrings of self-feeling show the inchoate structure of self-referential activity as internally related to its own inner states. The provocative perplexity of the passage stems from its attempt to think through the ways in which a feeling of self is in some sense unified with every particular determination of the sentient manifold and that this content could not be experienced as such without this very binding centre of subjective unity.

The problem is that at this point in the analysis there is no explicit ‘I’ established which might accompany, in a Kantian sense of the unity of apperception, “every determination” but only the opaque and constantly shifting feeling of self immanent in every distinct feeling. We think that it is this perplexing feeling of self that allows us to also assert Hegel’s affinity with Fichte: the active, constitutive agency of spirit as a finite subject that permeates its structures all the way down and which, for Hegel, has its origins in the very materials of the natural itself, a move which simultaneously marks a break with the given of nature in the Fichtean framework (Anstoss or not-I). That break brings Hegel closer to Schellingian Naturphilosophie and its insistence on the identity between the ideal and real. Self-feeling, then, operates as an unconscious feeling of self which is negatively (transformatively) reflected back from, and symbiotically identified within, the manifold of particular feelings. If this is the case then there is a way in which the soul of self-feeling is ensconced within the expulsions of its own intuitive projections—radically identified with each and every sentient determination yet, simultaneously, as the universality of form, reflected back as the transformative activity that makes them its own. Here then we see the perplexing contradictory move of the very form mutating into content and, conversely, the content into form. The fluctuating manifold of sense and feeling, consequently, trembles with a minimal surplus implicating a negative fissure residing immanently within and yet beyond its immediate content, i.e. its negative unitary centre—the self of feeling.

The possibility of particularized self-feeling is therefore important in Hegel’s account of the establishment of consciousness proper in that the subject must be connected to, and identified with, any and every sentient determination otherwise it would risk remaining alienated from them, they would not be its
own, it would be oblivious to itself and in so doing would destroy the very structure of self-relationality necessary to its own possibility (i.e. it would be self-refuting). We can further accentuate the importance of particularized self-feeling by situating it in terms of more developed forms of consciousness. We need to recall that Hegel’s analysis in the Anthropology moves from the most abstract determinations of soul and spirit to the most concrete; this means that rudimentary forms, such as feeling, must be analyzed before more complex structures can be introduced into the architectonic of the analysis. Hegel shows how these most abstract states in a sense presuppose actual consciousness, there is a way in which there can be no sentient content for the human creature without the presupposition of something which supersedes it (e.g. consciousness proper), that which would be aware of it as such. Nevertheless, what Hegel wants to show is the necessary interrelations amongst the various stages, and this requires moving from the most abstract determinations of subjectivity, and working through how those indeterminacies generate more complex totalities that reside beyond them, yet, in necessary connection to them. What this method of philosophical analysis means is that these primary stages of the soul’s development are never entirely abandoned by more concrete forms of spirit – they remain irrevocably bound up in one another (this bringing forth of what is former is one of the ways in which, as Greene notes, spirit is different from nature, nature perpetually falls outside itself – leaving one domain external to the other).

With this distinction in mind, we need to consider developed consciousness as an actuality and the inchoate feeling soul as they relate to the structure of self-feeling in order to further our attempt to substantiate our central claim concerning the problem natural exteriority poses for subjectivity. In a sense, as we have seen, the entire register of feeling is an extension and development of the corporeal body and its psychosomatic interface as instantiated under the rubric of sensibility. We might say, therefore, that feeling operates as the unconscious internalization of external sensibility and its corporeal body. In accord with DeVies and Williams we have also attempted to show that the inverted lining, as it were, of sensibility is the interiorized fluctuations of feelings or, as Alfredo Ferrarin aptly phrases it, how spirit is “active in its passivity.” If this is the case then there is a way in which feeling and self-feeling operate as precise expressions of the soul’s restructuring activity by which it takes the factual materials of its contextual milieu, given to it by way of sensibility, and makes them its own. This more pronounced reconstructive project just is the domain of feeling which Hegel characterizes as “…simple ideality, [the] subjectivity of sensibility [empfindens].” In this sense, we take the content of self-feeling to be ambivalent: it is simultaneously connected to the contingent determinations of the corporeal body and the materials which are forced upon the body from the immediacy of its factical environment while, simultaneously, being realigned within the very project of the soul’s ideality and therefore a result of the soul’s own self-referential activity. Feeling is what spirit makes of itself. This ambivalence, which we might connect to Greene’s “two levels of selfhood” (materiality and ideality), helps us to establish the ways in which the contents of the feeling soul, as manifested in self-feeling, then, are in some real sense thoroughly permeated with the factically given pulsations of the soul’s environment, i.e. the materiality of its preconditions. They come to the soul as contingently given from the “inarticulate mass” of sensibility and, because it has no claim to the origins of this content, there is a way in which these permutations operate as precise expressions of those conditions which are extimately imposed upon the individual.

One of the problems self-feeling establishes, then, on the interpretation we are attempting, is that the very content of self-feeling might, for various reasons of trauma and pain suffered in the world, come to dominate more developed forms of consciousness such that the subject retreats from the objective-intersubjective world and rigidly identifies with a content that is both its own, yet paradoxically, not its own. The result is that the developed subject might become estranged from itself and this is what Bethold-Bond means when he speaks of the “decentering of reason”: one risks a reversion to “…feeling, passion, the instincts…seclusion,
privacy, the self-withdrawn into the narcissistic cocoon…Feeling is a private language for Hegel…”66 This reversion displaces, decentres reason, to the extent that one is cut-off from the intersubjective domain of the objective and buried, as it were, in the subjective content of feeling. Self-feeling establishes the possibility that one might be dominated by content which, in a sense, has come to it contingently by way of the externality of its environment. Subjectivity is mutilated by that which it does not incorporate within the domain of its integrated totality.

This type of loss and trauma suffered at the hands of ‘misplaced’ feeling is one of the significations Hegel assigns psychopathological states. Speaking of the unruliness of this content, he writes:

…On account of the immediacy within which self-feeling [Selbstgefühl] is still determined, i.e. on account of the moment of corporeity there which is still undetached from spirituality, and since feeling itself is also a particular and hence a specific embodiment, the subject which has developed an understanding consciousness is still subject to disease in that it remains engrossed in a particularity of its self-awareness which it is unable to work up into ideality and overcome.67

On the reading we are proposing, then, one of the significations of Hegel’s account of self-feeling is that it has the potential to operate as a pathological domination of developed consciousness’s autopoetic structure insofar as it serves to dirempt-consciousness between its integrated and perspectival opening on the world (the objective, intersubjective register), on the one hand, and an unplaced feeling emanating from the facticity of its given environment on the other, which it is unable to place in the systematic fluidity of its objective relations within the world. This loss, this protrusion from subjectivity’s integrated totality, results in a maintained division within the very structure of consciousness itself. When this protrusion is maintained it intensifies and is brought to its logical extreme. The results are dire: “…the subject therefore finds itself involved in a contradiction between the totality systematized in its consciousness and the particular determinateness which is not fluidified and given its place and rank within it. This is madness [Verrücktheit].”68 Consequently, when considered retroactively from the perspective of concrete shapes of consciousness (the content of phenomenology, psychology, objective spirit etc.), this sense of the psychopathology of self-feeling is understood quite literally as a regression into the indeterminate interiority of sentient feeling – the objective and subjective poles of consciousness are radically dirempted. The self has the ability to fall apart into a traumatic disunion.

In acute paranoia, for instance, one feels persecuted by their neighbor but there is nothing in the objective relations of the world into which, and by which, that feeling might be integrated. In a sense, we construct this aspect of the world, i.e. persecution, solely from a feeling that this is the case. One is dominated by a feeling that has come to it externally, a content that one has not adequately integrated into the totality of their objective opening on the world and it is this inability to place this feeling, to verify it, as it were, that actively undermines the fluid totality of consciousness proper. It is this retrogressive feature of Hegel’s account of mental illness that has allowed Berthold-Bonds69 and Mills70 to connect Hegel to Freud concerning the symptoms of various modes of psychopathology and even the projective element involved in such states (wish fulfillment, abandonment of reality principle etc.).

On the reading we are proposing then we view Hegel’s analysis of the obscure unconscious field of feeling, self-feeling and the psychopathology of their immanent movements as indicative of an ambivalent tension permeating the entirety of the analysis. Self-feeling implicates, simultaneously, soul’s connection with its factical environment, its pre-individuated material origins and its developing potency, its intensification as a subjective centre of transformative agency. More often than not one side or the other of
these moments is emphasized when what is necessary is an emphasis of both as what is crucial in the Hegelian project is the way in which it refuses to collapse into one or other polarities of antinomic tensions. It, instead, insists on doing justice to both by attempting to establish a framework that concentrates on the total dynamical process as situated within that very relation. What we are claiming then amounts to asserting that the problem of psychopathology needs to be framed in terms of the prehistorical anteriority of the individual. Self-feeling indicates the subject’s connection to an entire domain of content that is not its own yet which, paradoxically, is nevertheless taken up as its very own. We read this unruly content to be a symptomatic indication of the conditions which mark out the anteriority of the individual which connects to the entire domain of nature as radical exteriority that we have argued characterizes Hegelian nature.

In a sense, this content marks an absence, akin to the limits of a visual field, a knot in the structure of individuality, around and through which it nevertheless must necessarily emerge. Psychopathology makes explicit the ways in which the external materials of pre-individuality haunt the emerging present and future of culture and spirit in its infancy, viz. its historical development. To the extent that developed subjectivity retains the ability to regress into psychopathology that possibility in a very real sense haunts developed consciousness: it is always possible yet not always actual. If this is the case, we can say that ‘madness’ operates as the future’s haunting past, a nightmare of fragmentary pulsations that stem from an inarticulate ground of origin that permeates and reverberates within the most infantile and fragile structures of inchoate spirit. More abstractly stated, acute psychopathological structures highlight how the logically superior is subjugated to the ontologically prior. This anteriority, we believe, is nothing other than the unrluliness of the natural register taking a hammer to the seamless framework of spirit’s conceptual register. What we see in Hegel’s analysis of self-feeling and psychopathology, then, is the constant threat nature poses to spirit’s autarkic actualization: it is a precise expression of the ways in which nature’s extimacy undermines spirit’s internal self-differentiating process, prompting the latter to go haywire.

3. The Implications of Nature’s Spectral Haunting of Hegelian Subjectivity

If we take seriously our reading of Hegelian nature, maintaining that it consists in radical fragmentation, then we have a precise sense of the problem that the natural register poses for speculative dialectics more generally. Because the natural domain is that of the non-thought, and extimate materiality, it is that which remains reticent to conceptual thought and the unifying, integrative power immanent within the very activity of reason itself. In this sense, Hegel’s writings on nature and anthropology show us the very real ways in which subjectivity, more, the entire project of spirit as free self-actualizing activity, has to perpetually confront its origins in the unruliness of nature, its extimate materiality. Nature provides the materials for spirit’s restructive activity and, simultaneously, presents the conditions for the utter annihilation of that same effort. Hegel’s anthropology shows us, therefore, the intense paradoxical tension that the Hegelian subject consistently takes up: nature is the basal condition from which the finite subject must emerge, and establishes the ways in which those very conditions prove a threat to more sophisticated shapes of subjectivity proper. ‘Madness’ and psychopathology, as they unfold in Hegel’s conceptual rendering, are phenomena that mark spirit’s traumatic breakdown, its regression into those states that unleash the prehistory of its facticality, the anteriority of its basal ground in the fragmentation of material nature. In such instances, we want to maintain, Hegel’s writings show us the relentless ways in which the natural register spectrally haunts subjectivity: in these phenomena we witness the outbreak of the exteriority characteristic of the natural register. That exteriority has the ability to utterly incapacitate subjectivity, undermine its self-actualization. Pathological phenomena, therefore, ultimately show us the other side of spirit, its fragility, its capacity for breakdown and fragmentation, the ways in which it is perpetually threatened with annihilation at the hands of its unruly other. In this sense, we believe we need
nature presents spirit with the possibility of its own negation. Nature marks out the possibility of spirit’s very absence, outlines the dimensions of spirit’s own grave.

Considering this problematic from a historical perspective, we might even go so far as to venture the suspicion that what Hegel’s analysis ultimately reveals are the ways in which the entire project of the Enlightenment is perpetually confronted with what haunts the very contours of reason, i.e. the silence of irrationality as expressed in trauma and breakdown and instigated by the problematic of the monstrosity of nature. If we trust Isaiah Berlin’s succinct characterization of three key principles that have proven crucial to Rationalism since antiquity, and the unique variation the Enlightenment put on them, then we are in a position to see just how startling Hegel’s analysis is. Of these Rationalist tenets, Berlin writes:

There are three propositions…upon which the whole Western tradition rested. First, that all genuine questions can be answered, that if a question cannot be answered it is not a question…The second proposition is that all these answers are knowable, that they can be discovered by means which can be learnt and taught to other persons…The third proposition is that all the answers must be compatible with one another, because, if they are not compatible, then chaos will result…Those are the general propositions of the rationalist Western tradition…The particular twist which the Enlightenment gave to this tradition was to say that the answers were not to be obtained in many of the hitherto traditional ways…not…by revelation…not…by tradition…not…by dogma…There is only one way of discovering these answers, and that is by the correct use of reason, deductively as in the mathematical sciences, inductively as in the sciences of nature. That is the only ways in which answers in general – true answers to serious questions – may be obtained.”

What Hegel’s analysis of the emergence of subjectivity shows us is the ways in which nature, understood as that which has the persistent possibility to traumatize spirit and subjectivity, operates as an opaque source which has the ability to destabilize conceptual discourse, the very substance, as it were, of reason’s activity. Without hyperbolically overstating the important implications at hand, our suspicion is that what Hegel’s analysis shows us at bottom are the ways in which the entire project of spirit, understood in terms of human freedom and reasonable self-determination, is perpetually threatened with collapse, silence and ultimately annihilation by the fragmentation that constitutes Hegelian nature. To the extent that subjectivity and spirit have the perpetual possibility of various modalities of pathology they are perpetually threatened with regressions that are antithetical to their very essence: exteriority, fragmentation, the flat-line of death.

This is why, on our reading, Hegel’s refusal to glamorize nature in his infamous comments to the poet Heine, concerning the Milky Way as a gleaming leprosy in the sky, take on a very precise signification. What nature marks out in no uncertain terms is the perpetual possibility of spirit’s (reason’s) collapse, its ultimate inability to exhaustively overcome exteriority when set within – and against – the context of the natural register. What we have called nature’s spectral haunting of the entire endeavor of subjectivity, then, means the very possibility of freedom and reason’s destruction – the fact of its vulnerability to disease etc. Nature’s abyssal quality instantiates the struggle which reason must somehow carry on in perpetuity: attempt to render coherent that which potentially might annihilate the conditions necessary to the very process of that rendering.

This is not, however, to suggest that, in the spirit of Kant, nature is an inaccessible noumenal domain, beyond which spirit cannot go. Subjectivity and spirit, are always already immersed in the process
of restructuring nature in terms of its own ends, constructing what Hegel calls a second nature. Therefore, more radically, our reading claims that what Hegel’s thought shows us in this context is the perpetual problem the anteriority of the natural register continues to pose to subjectivity and its socio-cultural actualization all the way down the line. The conditions that subjectivity presupposes continually have the possibility to break forth in such a way that is detrimental to subjectivity. The merit of Hegel’s thought in this context shows its forceful purchase in that it allows us to think precisely the very problem itself without collapsing into dogmatic conclusions regarding its successful resolution. This is why we believe Hegel’s position anticipates one of the central upshots of Dialectic of Enlightenment with which we began: it gives us the conceptual tools with which to think the problem of nature as it relates to subjectivity and spirit in its complexity without dissolving the problem, assigning it the status of a ‘pseudo-problem,’ or resorting to mere talk of the domination of nature as articulated, for instance, in the thought of Fichte.

Unlike the jargon of domination, Hegel shows us how the construction of spirit as second nature consists in multifarious activities of development which he demarcates by way of the concept of Bildung. Simultaneously, we also believe that the fecund implications of our interpretation require reading Hegelian nature as radically heterogeneous to the conceptual register; only in so doing do we get an intense sense of the problem nature poses to subjectivity and spirit, and the rich way in which Hegel’s thought addresses this unstable tension. Not only does our interpretation show itself as distinct in the secondary literature, contra Stone, it also gives us a precise sense of what is at hand within broader socio-historical implications; it allows us to read Hegel’s thought as that which addresses a fundamental problem addressing the late Enlightenment more generally, the way in which nature serves to destabilize the conceptual totality of reason’s holistic project.

Such a reading of Hegelian nature, however, is most certainly not a call to submit to irrationality and the like; instead, it is to insist that what Hegel’s system offers us is a sensitivity to the very real fragility permeating the human endeavor, a sensitivity that is too often forgotten in our contemporary renderings of one of the high points of German Idealism. Sensitivity to this problematic is anything but surrender. Ultimately, this reading has attempted to develop one of the ways in which Hegel continues to have untimely purchase for real concerns confronting subjectivity’s and, by extension, culture’s living present.

Endnotes

2 Concerning the “problem of nature” see especially their Ch.1 “The Concept of Enlightenment.”
3 We use Lacan’s neologism extimate (extimatu) and its cognates in order to signify a paradoxical state which consists in an external-intimacy and intimate-externality such that it problematizes binary distinctions of internality and externality. This problematic, then, works perfectly well in the context of Hegel’s philosophy of nature which repeatedly reveals nature’s lack of an adequately stable structure, especially as in that of subjectivity proper. Even, as we shall see, in animal subjectivity’s inchoate internality there is a fundamental way in which it collapses outward. In this sense, nature’s inwardness is still an externality. Lacan’s neologism reinforces this paradoxical problematic permeating the domain of nature all the way down.
4 Hegel citations are from Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, ed. and trans. M.J. Petry (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing, 1978), unless otherwise noted; hereafter PSS followed by paragraph (§), Zusatz and page number for
references where necessary (Zusatz, p.##); volume numbers are clearly indicated where specificity requires. Alternate citations are from Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, trans. William Wallace and A.V Miller (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1988), hereafter PM followed by paragraph (§). Original German terms are from Werke [in 20 Banden auf der Grundlage der Werke von 1832-45], eds. E. Moldenhauer and K.M. Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), hereafter W followed by volume number and paragraph (§). Original German terms indicated with square brackets.


6 See PSS, Volume One, p.1-li. The following remarks concerning the development of Hegel’s thought in this context are expressions of Petry’s research.

7 See PSS, Volume One, p.xxxix.

8 PN§250 Remark; PN§370 Remark (§368 in 3rd ed. of Encyclopaedia). See footnote 10 for bibliographical information for this text.

9 PN§250, PN§250 Remark; W9 §250. See footnote 10 for bibliographical information for this text.

10 Citations are from Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, ed. and trans. M.J. Petry (New York: Humanities Press, 1969); hereafter PN followed by paragraph (§), Zusatz and page number for references where necessary (Zusatz, p.##); volume numbers are clearly indicated where specificity requires.

11 The position advanced here would not be possible without numerous discussions with Jeff Renaud and Joseph Carew concerning the interpretive problems surrounding Hegel’s philosophy of nature.

12 PN§247.

13 PN§247.


15 PN§247.

16 See, for instance, PN§248 Remark, PN§250, PN§250 Remark.

17 PN§248 Remark.

18 PN§250, PN§250 Remark.

19 PN§250 Remark.


21 See, for instance, Stone’s second chapter: “The Development of Nature: Overcoming the Division between Thought and Matter” (pp.29-56).

22 PN§370. Remark.

23 See Jeffrey Reid’s Real Words: Language and System in Hegel (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), p.41.

24 W9§368.

25 PN§371.

26 Although Hegel does not use the term “pathological norm” his thought is clearly compatible with this concept. Pathological states are a function of the relationship between the organism and its environment. A pathological norm establishes a reduction in the organism’s register of possible responses to external stimuli. In this sense Hegel can be read as anticipating Georges Canguilhem’s writings on pathology as developed in the latter’s The Normal and the Pathological, trans. Carolyn R. Fawcett (New York: Zone Books, 1989). See p. 143ff.

27 PSS§388

28 PSS§390, Zusatz, p.21.


30 PSS§391.

31 PSS§388.

32 PSS§387, Zusatz, p.85.

33 SeeLOGGER'S TOOL WHERE YOU CAN ADD YOUR LOCAL CONTENT HERE.

(spirit and nature) maintaining that this dynamic operates as the ground of Hegel’s entire philosophy of spirit and indicates one of the ways in which nature is never fully abandoned by the domain of spirit. Our reading is complimentary to this approach while seeking to systematically develop the pathological dimensions that permeate that dynamic. Nuzzo writes: “Spirit’s presence within nature (initially, its being immersed in it) or the soul’s immanence in corporeality (as its immanent purpose) is the point of departure of freedom’s realization. By turning the connection between nature and spirit into the basis on which the Anthropology institutes the soul/body relation, Hegel fundamentally transforms the alternative between “idealism” and “materialism,” setting his own philosophy of spirit on a thoroughly different terrain” (p.12). She later states: “…the ideality that spirit itself is because it arises from nature and takes place within nature is also the new meaning of the soul’s “immateriality”…This is the starting point of the “Anthropology.” But it is also the permanent basis of the entire philosophy of spirit. Even in its highest and most developed forms Hegelian Geist remains fundamentally connected to the body and corporeality” (p.14). In this sense we share a common interpretation of these two registers in the Anthropology, their thorough-going interpenetration, though we seek to further pursue the nature-spirit dynamic in terms of its pathological dimension.

If this interpretation is correct then there is some sense in which it must maintain the non-identity of thought and nature while maintaining that there is also some fundamental sense in which nature is crucial to the genesis of subjectivity and spirit’s autopoeic activity. In this way, our interpretation seeks to develop a position that explores the possibilities regarding which is non-thought (material nature) as being crucial to the genesis of thought (ideality). In other words, neither would be completely inaccessible to the other. However, this reading simultaneously problematizes William Maker’s claim that nature and spirit are radically heterodox. See Maker’s “The Very Idea of the Idea of Nature, or Why Hegel Is Not an Idealist,” in Hegel and the Philosophy of Nature ed. Stephen Houlgate (New York: SUNY, 1998), pp.1-28. Consider Maker’s claim: “…Hegel originates the Philosophy of Nature with the notion of the radical nonidentity of thought and nature, holding that thought and nature do not even resemble one another, that they quite literally have nothing in common…” (p.4). While we accept the starting point (radical difference of the two), we also think there must be some obscure sense in which nature, through its own immanent movements, generates structures that come to have an affinity with thought. Without this possibility the question becomes: how do these two registers come into contact in order to avoid the pain of dualism? We will look to temper Maker’s position with a more moderate route that seeks to maintain the tension inherent in soul that indeterminately connects the unruliness of nature with that of the self-referentiality of spirit. Our point, then, is to think through the radical entanglement situated at the heart of the Anthropology in such a way that shows spirit and nature reciprocally intertwined and mutually at the other’s throat. For a clear statement of our concern regarding Maker’s conclusion, see Philip T. Grier’s “The Relation of Mind to Nature: Two Paradigms” in Essays on Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit ed. David S. Stern (New York: SUNY, 2013), pp. 223-246. Grier writes: “The more usual conception typically found in various versions…of the mind-body problem…is that the physical and mental are entirely distinct, which renders the gradual or phased emergence of the one from the other either inconceivable or thoroughly mysterious…” (p.228).

We cite from the Wallace translation as it has a poetic element that escapes Petry’s rendering of the same passage while, simultaneously, not neglecting any of the nuances of sensibility’s indeterminate connection to its environment.

Sensibility and ideality are one through the other, one for the other, and one in the other. In sensibility, being-for-itself awakens: it differentiates itself from the simple being-right-at-itself in which it is still asleep. The “right-at-itself” – which already bears the fold of self upon self, identity such on itself – unfolds or unglues its own adherence. Upon awakening, I am an other. There are things outside me, and I myself am for myself the one who has these things in front of him. Doubtless, the sentient being that is only sentient also becomes its own sensation and sinks into it:
but, in and as sensation, such a being also becomes what it is as its subject. Sensibility is becoming: passage from a simple determinateness to a property. Sensation is mine – or rather, if it is not yet the universal mineness of the one who says “I,” it is, in animal and vegetal sensation, the sensation proper to one who senses (p.46-47).

In sensibility, then, the individual’s immediate substantiality is put forth as a moment within its subjective being-for-self. This is crucial as it marks spirit’s first attempts to break with the pure plenitude of substantial being. It is our purpose to track this emergent subjective intensity – which here is held fast in the contractions and expansions of an alien world.

40 See, for instance, Merleau-Ponty’s _Phenomenology of Perception_, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Routledge, 2006) where he argues that the constitution of a spatial level constitutes: “…a certain possession of the world by my body, a certain gearing of my body to the world” (p.291). Analogously, Hegel would seem to suggest that sensibility involves a similar preconscious grasp on the world – it is only through the bodily grasp that there might first be a world for it.

41 _PSS_§403. Emphasis mine.

42 Malabou, p.33.

43 _PSS_§401, Zusatz, p.193.

44 Hegel distinction between sensibility and feeling was not established until rather late (developing in precision in lectures spanning from 1822-25). It was utterly absent from the 1817 _Encyclopaedia_ (See Petry’s discussion of these issues in _PSS_, Volume Two, p.485 and p.494). See also, Robert R. Williams’s footnote 94 in the _Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit_ trans. Robert R. Williams (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.110. We take Hegel’s struggle to distinguish between the two, and the significant overlap that resides between the domains of their application, to be indicative of an ambiguity that resides immanently within both, viz. because the states being analyzed are immediate and largely indeterminate it becomes difficult to clearly distinguish interior contra exterior (ideal vs. material); there is no simple and all encompassing means by which to rigidly distinguish these two concepts and their corresponding domains of application within the context of the development of the soul to this point. Their problematic interpenetration, consequently, is a result of the subject matter being analyzed, i.e. the indeterminacy of soul’s natural origins and the soul’s immersion in those origins.

45 _PSS_§403.

46 Although we largely agree with William A. DeVries’ reading of sensibility as passive and the subsequent category of feeling (Gefühl) as active we would like to nuance this distinction in order to emphasize the activity that sensibility itself showcases. See Hegel’s _Theory of Mental Activity: An Introduction to Theoretical Spirit_ (London: Cornell University Press, 1988) where DeVries writes: “In sensation mind is passive, receptive, unorganized, aimed at the individual, dispersed in a manifold…the distinction between a sensation and a feeling is simply that a feeling is a sensation that has a place in a very low-level, basic, organized system of sensations” (DeVries, p. 71). _Our claim would be such that sensibility is already involved in this “low-level” ordering and that it would have to be such in order to be recognized as sensible in the first place._

47 Malabou, p.35.

48 To this point in our study we have referred mainly to Petry’s translation. However, with “Selbsteinfühl” we follow Wallace’s more literal translation “self-feeling” in place of Petry’s “self-awareness.” It is not immediately clear how Petry justifies “awareness” for “gefühl.” It is our suspicion that in such a location he attempts to connect Hegel’s analysis of the soul’s reflexivity to Kant’s unity ofapperception and the self-positing activity of the Fichtean subject – although this is only a speculative hypothesis. We think pursuing the maxim that the most literal translation is best forces us to follow Wallace insofar as “feeling” comes closer to the content of the previous moments that compose the structure of sensibility (Empfindung) and the primary significance of “gefühl.” In his translation of Erdmann’s _Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit_ 1827-1828 (footnote 94, p.110) Williams’ discussion of the ambivalent use of these two terms in no way indicates why “awareness” would operate as a justifiable equivalent of “gefühl.” Because it is not explicitly clear why “awareness” would prove the superior choice we opt for Wallace’s and Williams’ more literal translation, “feeling.” “Feeling” we read as implicating an internal relationship with the concept of sensibility. This ambiguous internal relation is crucial to Hegel’s analysis but lost by way of “awareness.”


53 See DeVries’ clear and concise discussion of “self-feeling,” pp. 74-77. For example, he writes that in mental illness one takes: “…the immediate unity found in its feelings to be objective itself, removing its thinking from the constraints of the objective world” (p. 77).

54 See Greene’s discussion of “self-feeling,” pp. 120-133.


56 This thesis is similar to the central thrust of Malabou’s reading of the self-feeling. She writes: “The feeling of self itself becomes a personal and specific feeling…The form needs to be the content of all that it forms…” (p. 35).

57 *PS§407*. Translation slightly modified.

58 See DeVries, p. 76ff.

59 Greene, p. 42.

60 See his discussion of feeling, pp. 71-86.

61 See Williams’s footnote 94 in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit 1827-28*, p. 110.


63 *PS§403*. Translation slightly modified.

64 See Greene, p. 129. Here understood in terms of receptivity and activity.

65 Wallace translation, p. 102.


67 *PS§408*. Translation slightly modified.

68 *PS§408*. Translation slightly modified.

69 See, for instance, Berthold-Bond’s book where he connects Freud and Hegel on the issues of reversion and regression, p. 25ff.

70 Mills explicitly connects the regressive move to Freudian analysis throughout his monograph. See, for example, p. 157.